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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
At the heart of constitutional debate over government aid for
parochial schools lies the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment--"Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion." And at the heart of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence lies the so-called "primary effects" test,
articulated in 197 I's Lemon v. Kurtzman: If the aid in question has
a primary effect that either advances or inhibits religion, then it
violates the Constitution.'
It is true that the much-maligned but still influential Lemon case
actually requires courts to execute three tests to determine whether
a challenged program of aid to parochial schools runs afoul of the
Establishment Clause, whether it be state-subsidized textbooks or
state-financed field trips, state-supported counseling services or
state-underwritten remedial instruction, vouchers or tuition-tax
credits. Specifically, Lemon directs judges to ask not only whether
the aid program in question has the primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion, but also whether it reflects a clearly secular
purpose and whether it avoids excessive entanglement with
religion.' But as one commentator has noted, "the primary effect
standard has emerged as the essence of establishment clause
analysis."' As far as the entanglement test is concerned, as Justice
Thomas put it in the most recent Supreme Court parochial-school
1. 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
2. See id.
3. Case Comment, Statute Granting Tax Deduction for Tuition Paid By Parents of
Sectarian and Nonsectarian School Children Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause:
Mueller v. Allen, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 269, 284 (1983); see also Porta v. Klagholz, 19 F. Supp.
2d 290, 297 (D.N.J. 1998) (stating that the Supreme Court has "essentially collapsed the
Lemon test so that the focus is on whether the challenged activity has the effect of advancing
religion"); Richard E. Morgan, The Establishment Clause and Sectarian Schools: A Final
Installment?, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 57, 73 (1973) (stating that the entanglement test deals with
a "secondary evil'); Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal
ProtectionApproach to Establishment ClauseAdjudication, 61NOTREDAMEL.REV. 311,331-
32 (1986) ("The three-part Lemon test thus becomes a modified one-part'effects' test ... the
real issue in any religion clause case."). Although Justice O'Connor has advanced a
competing "endorsement" test to determine the existence of an Establishment Clause
violation, the Court has never used it in a government-aid-to-school case. See Eric J. Segall,
Parochial SchoolAidRevisited The Lemon Test, the Endorsement Test andReligious Liberty,
28 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 263, 280, 286 (1991).
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aid case, Mitchell v. Helms, "[we acknowledged that our cases
discussing excessive entanglement [apply] many of the same
considerations as... our cases discussing primary effect, and we
therefore [have] recast Lemon's entanglement inquiry as simply one
criterion relevant to determining a statute's effect."4 As for the
"secular purpose" test, in Mitchell-as in all post-Lemon
cases-those challenging the aid did not raise it as an issue; hence,
as Justice Thomas said, "we will consider only [the aid's] effect."5
Indeed, having essentially refined the Lemon test down to one of
its three prongs (the primary-effects test) the Supreme Court has
further refined that prong itself. First, as one state supreme court
noted as early as 1974 while summing up the evolution of recent
U.S. Supreme Court doctrine: "In applying the'primary effects test,'
we must be guided by the realization... that this is no longer a
primary effects test, but an 'any effects test."' As long as one of the
aid's effects (even if not its most significant effect) is to advance or
inhibit religion, then it risks violating the Establishment Clause.
Second, the Court has, to use Douglas Laycock's term,
"disaggregated" the test, deciding the question of whether a
particular form of state aid "advances" religion in a manner
4. 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2540 (2000).
5. Id.
6. Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. State, 224 N.W.2d 344, 353 (Minn. 1974). For a
similar analysis, see Justice Powell's opinion in Committee forPublic Education & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, where he stated:
Appellees, focusing on the term "principal or primary effect" which this Court
has utilized in expressing the second prong of the three part test... have
argued that the Court must decide in these cases whether the 'primary" effect
of New York's tuition grant program is to subsidize religion.... We do not
think that such metaphysical judgments are either possible or necessary. Our
cases simply do not support the notion that a law found to have a "primary"
effect to promote some legitimate end under the State's police power is immune
from further examination to ascertain whether it also has the direct and
immediate effect of advancing religion... Any remaining question about the
contours of the"effect" criterion [note that Justice Powell has even dropped the
modifier "primary"] were resolved bythe Court's decision in Tilton, in which the
plurality found the mere possibility that a federally financed structure might
be used for religious purposes 20 years hence was constitutionallyunacceptable
because the grant might "in part have the effect of advancing religion."
413 U.S. 756, 783 n.39 (1973). Likewise, in Mitchell, Justice Thomas dropped the modifier
"primary" and speaks simply of determining an aid package's effect. See Mitchell, 120 S. Ct.
at 2540.
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separate and apart from the approach it takes to the issue of
whether it "inhibits" religion.7 Laycock offers a compelling criticism
of this kind of disaggregation, but my purpose here is to accept it as
a given, and then look far more closely at how courts determine
whether, in fact, a particular form of state aid to parochial schools
"advances" (as opposed to inhibits) religion. It is this question that
is now the sine qua non of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
More specifically, in this Article I critically examine the
rhetorical structure of the arguments typically wielded by either
side in cases involving state-supplied aid to parochial schools-from
state-supported bus transportation to free textbooks, from vouchers
to tuition tax credits, from state-financed test administration to
state-sponsored supplemental instruction. Critics of the particular
aid program at issue of course claim that such aid does have the
effect of advancing religion, and defenders deny any such thing. In
undertaking this analysis, I bring to light a contradiction that, in
mirror-image form, lies at the heart of each camp's argumentation.
I say "mirror-image," because in debating the first of what I shall
identify as the effects test's two main issues, the pro-aid side
embraces one particular set of assumptions and the anti-aid side a
competing set. Yet in debating the test's second issue, they
exchange positions, each now embracing what it had previously
denied, and denying what it had previously embraced. I thus
operate here within a tradition of commentary that exposes deep,
structural "contradictions that . . . pervade the whole legal
framework" in particular constitutional domains.'
In showing how each of the two competing positions on state aid
for parochial schools rests on the same kind of contradiction (albeit
one the mirror image of the other), I do not myself vindicate one of
the two sides over its opponent. Following Michael Walzer, I resist
imposing my own moral yardstick on Establishment Clause
7. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993, 1007 (1990).
8. WilliamE. Forbath, TakingLefts Seriously, 92YALEL.J. 1041,1044 (1983) (reviewing
THE Poimcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 1982)); see also Andrew
Stark, Strange Bedfellows: Two Paradoxes in Constitutional Discourse over Corporate and
Individual PoliticalActivity, 14 CARDOzo L. RsV. 1343, 1343-44 (1993) (noting and rejecting
the tendency of scholars to place great emphasis on the contradictions in the law and to take
sides).
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discourse; rather, I operate in an interpretive mode, one that
struggles to find meaning in the text of constitutional discourse, in
the way in which people explain and justify what they do, the
stories they tell.' As A.B. Atkinson puts it, it can often prove more
fruitful when our concern lies with "the grammar of arguments
about policy not with the advocacy of policies themselves."' °
I take this approach principally because constitutional discourse
over state aid to parochial schools is radically open; cases on the
subject have been decided by slim majorities, justices themselves
have shifted positions over time, and lower courts continue to
produce conflicting decisions." In fact, the only thing that remains
stable is the rhetoric, the argumentation, that each side invariably
advances no matter what kind of aid is at issue. Hence, it makes
more sense to look at the enduring structural arguments both sides
advance than to account for the current state of the law, which is
anything but settled.
It is no small matter to show what it is that aid proponents and
opponents are actually arguing about, for they themselves are often
confused about exactly where it is they engage each other. In Part
I, preliminary to my main argument, I show that the effects test
actually resolves itself into two tests, which I call the "incentive"
and"fungibility" tests, and it is over how to apply them in any given
case that aid proponents and opponents divide. In Part II, I look at
the core assumptions animating either side in debate over the
9. See MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM (1987).
10. A.B. ATKINSON, SOCIALJUSTICE AND PU3LIC POLICY 199 (1983) (internal quotations
omitted).
11. See Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2538-39. Justice Thomas noted the considerable "degree
to which our Establishment Clause jurisprudence has shifted in recent times, while
nevertheless retaining anomalies with which the lower courts have had to struggle. [Lower
courts have] abandoned any effort to find coherence in our case law or divine the future
course of our decisions." I& Even Mitchell itself was not supported by a single majority
opinion, as Linda Greenhouse noted in reporting the case for the New York Times: "[T]he
court's jurisprudence on the subject of permissible public aid to religious schools has been in
turmoil for years... and the justices' failure to settle on a single majority opinion after seven
months showed that the turmoil was likelyto continue." Linda Greenhouse, JusticesApprove
U.S. Financing of Religious Schools' Equipment, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,2000, atA27; see also
Kathleen M. Sullivan, A Court Not Easy to Classify, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at A31
(stating that in Mitchell, "the court... divid[ed] rigidly into two camps, and... future
outcomes do hang by one vote. [The] four justices [who formed the plurality] do not yet have
a clear fifth vote for the constitutionality ofvouchersP and other forms of aid).
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incentive test, and in Part III, I do the same with the fungibility
test. In Part IV, I tie up one loose end and then, in Part V and the
conclusion, I show what will have become mountingly evident in the
previous sections, namely, that the arguments that aid advocates
typically make in urging that a particular aid program meets the
first (incentive) test contradict, at a fundamental level, the claims
they make in urging that it meets the second (fungibility) test. And,
in a kind of mirror-image way, the same is true of aid-opponents:
The arguments they habitually advance to show that a given
program fails the first test contradict those they put forward in
demonstrating that it fails the second test. Paradoxically, then, at
the deepest level a converse set of contradictions underlies the
arguments typically advanced by each side. My conclusion is that
for constitutional debate in this arena ever to advance, each side is
going to have to address the internal contradiction that lies at its
heart.
I. MONEY, PURPOSES, INCENTIVES, AND FUNGIBILITY
To uncover the assumptions underlying the clashing stances
taken by participants in debate over public aid to parochial schools,
one must first characterize those stances. What, exactly, are
opponents and defenders of aid arguing about when they debate the
"effect" of any given aid program?
Here is a first cut: Aid opponents must (and indeed they
invariably do) portray the program in question as one that
illegitimately channels "public money [into] private purpose[s]," in
particular, the parochial purposes of the private schools.12 If the aid
12. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 115 N.W.2d 761, 771 (Wis. 1962) (emphasis
added). Although aid programs are invariably directed to private schools, parochial or not,
in all jurisdictions where cases have arisen, parochial schools constitute the "vast majority
of private schools." CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 308 (1993). Hence, as the
Supreme Court put it in Everson, a case concerning the constitutionality of a New Jersey
plan to extend free busing to private school students:
To say that New Jersey's appropriation and her use ofthe power of taxation for
raising the funds appropriated are not for public purposes but are for private
ends, is to say that they are for the support of religion and religious teaching.
Conversely, to say that they are for public purposes is to say that they are not
for religious ones [or for] the private character of the function of religious
education.
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can be so described, then the foundation for establishing its
unconstitutionality has been laid. Aid defenders, for their part, can
be understood as attempting to reversethat portrayal by depicting
the money in question as private, not public, and/or the purposes in
question as public, not private. After all, there can be nothing
unconstitutional about the disposition of private money-whether
it serves public and/or private purposes-nor can there be any
constitutional violation per se when public purposes receive money,
regardless of whether that money itself is better understood as
public or private.
But how exactly do opponents and defenders engage the twin
questions as to whether (a) the aid money and (b) its purposes are
better understood as public or private? Although there is confusion
on both scores which I try to dispel, I argue here that the first-the
question of whether the money is public or private-boils down to
what I will call the "incentive" test; and the second-the question
of whether its purposes are public or private-resolves itself into
what I will term the "fungibility" test.
A The "Incentive" Test
How do aid defenders and opponents go about arguing this first
question, the question of whether aid moneyis better understood as
public or private? What's at issue here?
When an aid defender conceives the money as private-
notwithstanding its origins in the public treasury-it is not because
the funds flow through the hands of private individuals (that is,
parents) before they reach any parochial school. After all, although
much aid-from tuition tax credits to assistance for purchasing
certain kinds of instructional material-does flow through parental
hands, not all aid does: think, for example, of state support for the
administration of exams at parochial schools. And in any case, the
court has said that mere "[p]ayment to the parent for transmittal
to the denominational school does not have a cleansing effect and
somehow cause the funds to lose their identity as public funds." 3
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 51 (1947).
13. Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399, 415 (S.D. Ohio 1972), vacated, 421 U.S 982
(1975); see Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,487 (1986) ("Aid
20011 1443
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Instead, what matters-and what aid proponents are better
understood as arguing-is that the particular quantum of aid in
question, though perhaps originating in the public treasury, flows
to the parochial school only because of the private choices parents
make as to where to educate their children. Whether it flows
indirectly to the parochial school, as do vouchers, or directly, as
with per capita state aid for test administration, it goes to the
parochial school in the first place only because parents have chosen
to send their children there. The money flows at parental discretion,
not that of the state, or so aid proponents urge;1' it reaches the
parochial school only through "multiple layers of private choice"
and is "completely devoid of state intervention or direction."i"
"Where... aid to parochial schools is available only as a result of
decisions of individual parents," the Supreme Court declared in
Mueller v. Allen, "no 'imprimatur of state approval' can be deemed
to have been conferred on any particular religion, or on religion
may have [unconstitutional] effect even though it takes the form of aid to students or
parents.").
Appellees seek to avoid Meek by emphasizing that it involved a program of
direct loans to nonpublic schools. In contrast, the material and equipment at
issue [here] are loaned to the pupil or his parent. In our view, however, it would
exalt form over substance if this distinction were found to justify a result
different from that in Meek .... Despite the technical change in legal bailee,
the program in substance is the same as before ....
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,250 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530
(2000).
14. See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606,612-14 (Ariz. 1999).
Our more recent cases address [the effects test] not through the direct/indirect
distinction but rather through the principle of private choice .... Although the
presence of private choice is easier to see when aid literally passes through the
hands of individuals ... there is no reason why the Establishment Clause
requires such a form.
Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2544-45.
[Bjecause Chapter 2 [a federal block grant program for the purchase of books,
reference materials, and computer hardware and software] provides equal
expenditures for private and public school students, the program, it can be
argued, ties a certain amount of aid to the back of each child. Therefore, any
benefit that goes to a religious school [even if it doesn't flow through parental
hands] does so "only as a result of the genuinely independent and private
choices of individuals."
BriefAmici Curiae of the Institute for Justice, et al. at 24, Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530
(2000) (No. 98-1648), LEXIS, 1998 U.S. Briefs 1648.
15. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 614.
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generally."16 Or, as Justice Souter memorably declared in
Rosenberger, a case involving the payment of mandatory student
fees to help underwrite campus religious publications, when aid
flows to religious ends only as a result of the intermediating and
genuinely independent choices of private individuals, it "break[s]
the circuit" between "the government and the ultimate religious
beneficiary" and therefore makes public money into "private
money."' 7
The argument over whether the money can best be understood as
public or private, then, comes down to this question: How much
"choice" do parents actually have? For as aid opponents typically
point out, if the aid program itself somehow influences parents to
send their children to parochial school-if it sufficiently skews their
choices-then parents would seem to relapse into mere "conduits"
for purposes the state aggressively wants to pursue, not "circuit
breakers" with discretion of their own, and the money would then
be better understood as public, not private.'8 "For an individual's
choice to be truly voluntary and autonomous of government"'P-for
the parent "not [to be] a mere conduit, but free to spend the money
he received in any manner'2-"the state may not attempt to
influence that choice."21
The debate between the two sides thus becomes most heated, and
identifies the true border area between public and private money,
when the question is whether the aid program creates an
"incentive" for parents to choose private as opposed to public school.
16. 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983) (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,274 (1981)).
17. Rosenbergerv. Rector &Visitors ofUniv. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819,886 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting). In Mueller, the Court stated:
[P]ublic funds become available [to religious schools] only as a result of
numerous private choices of individual parents of school-age children.... The
historic purposes of the [Establishment] Clause simply do not encompass the
sort of attenuated financial benefit, ultimately controlled by the private choices
of individual parents, that eventually flows to parochial schools from the
neutrally available tax benefit at issue in this case.
463 U.S. at 399-400.
18. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 350 F. Supp. 655, 668
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("[T]he parent is a mere conduit for a payment of tuition.").
19. Note, Government Neutrality and Separation of Church and State: Tuition Tax
Credits, 92 HARV. L. REV. 696, 697 (1979) [hereinafter Government Neutrality].
20. Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. State, 224 N.W.2d 334, 351 (Minn. 1974).
21. Government Neutrality, supra note 19, at 697.
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As the Court put it inAgostini v. Felton, a case dealing with aid to
parochial schools for supplemental instruction in secular subjects,
if the aid "criteria might themselves have the effect of advancing
religion by creating a financial incentive to undertake religious
indoctrination," the money is more public than private.22 That is,
when "the state create[s] . . . incentives for students to select
sectarian schools" and thus plays a "role in the decisionmaking
process that ultimately determine[s] where the funds [will] be
spent," then "religious institutions" do not "receive vocational
assistance 'only as a result of the genuinely independent and
private choices of aid recipients."2 ' In the presence of such
incentives, the money is better understood as public, not private.
On the other hand, if the money comes with no state-imposed
incentives or skewing mechanisms, then its expenditure is entirely
up to the discretion of the parents and it becomes more private than
public. "When the government offers [aid] that 'is in no way skewed
towards religion"-aid that "creates no financial incentive for
parents to choose a sectarian school"-its disposition "cannot be
attributed to state decisionmaking" and it "does not offend the
Establishment Clause."2 Or as Professor Eugene Volokh colorfully
puts it: "No one cares whether government employees or Social
Security recipients donate parts of their checks to religious
organizations [or whether] [clollege students . . . spend G.I. Bill
funds or Pell grants or government-subsidized student loans to
attend college at Notre Dame or Georgetown, even to study
theology."' No one cares, because those state programs inherently
create no incentive for the recipients to spend their money on
religious, as opposed to nonreligious, purposes. This means that
private discretion remains inviolate and the money becomes truly
private.
22. 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997).
23. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486-87 (1986));
see also Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2543 (2000) (discussing the "close relationship
between ... incentives, and private choice").
24. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993) (quoting Witters, 474
U.S. at 488).
25. Eugene Volokh, Vouched For, NEw REPUBLIC, July 6, 1998, at 12, available in 1998
WL 14173424.
1446 [Vol. 42:1437
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It is well settled that the Establishment Clause is not violated
every time money previously in the possession of a State is
conveyed to a religious institution. For example, a State may
issue a paycheck to one of its employees, who may then donate
all or part of that paycheck to a religious institution, all without
constitutional barrier....
After all, in the absence of any state-structured incentives, it is no
longer public but becomes private money.
The question of whether the money in question is private or
public, then, comes down to the question of whether the program
will skew the decision making of the parent concerned-whether
the aid will make the parent more likely to send his or her child to
parochial school.27 If it will, the money necessarily remains public;
if not, it becomes genuinely private. It is debate over this issue of
"incentive"-over whether it exists in any given case-that I
examine in Part IE.
B. The "Fungibility Test
Even if aid opponents are concededly right in describing the
money in question as public, not private, aid defenders offer a
second kind of reconceptualization: It is better, they say, to
understand that aid as devoted not to private but to public
purposes. How do they do this, and what exactly is the sticking
point here between them and aid opponents? Consider some
representative rhetoric.
26. Witters, 474 U.S. at 486-87. This is what the Witters Court meant when it declared
that "[a]ny aid provided under Washington's program [of aid for post-secondary students at
both public and parochial colleges] creates no financial incentive for students to undertake
sectarian education [and] is in no way skewed towards religion."Id, at 487-88. Consequently,
it iultimately flows to religious institutions... only as a result of the genuinely independent
and private choices of aid recipients." Id. at 487. As long as such choice exists, then the state
no more directs or controls that money than it does when it "issue[s] a paycheck to one of its
employees, [knowing that the employee would] donate all or part of that paycheck to a
religious institution." Id. at 486-87; see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 848 (1995) ("The benefit to religion under the program, therefore, is akin to a
public servant contributing her government paycheck to the church.").
27. See Cathy R. Jones, Comment, Mueller v. Allen: Do Tuition Tax Deductions Violate
the Establishment Clause?, 68 IowAL. REv. 539,546 (1983).
2001] 1447
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Far from taxing "some people to help others carry out their
private purposes," the Court declared in the 1947 Everson v. Board
of Education busing-aid case, "the New Jersey legislature has
decided that a public purpose will be served by using tax-raised
funds to pay the bus fares of all school children, including those who
attend parochial schools."' Along similar lines, in Board of
Education v. Allen, where the state-supported service in question
was textbook provision for parochial schools, the Court spoke
approvingly of the New York legislature's having found that the
"public welfare and safety require that the state and local
communities give assistance to [such] educational programs which
are important to our national defense and the general welfare of the
state."29 Tax credits for private-school tuition, to take yet another
example, are reconceived by aid defenders as measures in the public
interest, not as means of promoting the private purposes of
parochial schools. As William Billings of the National Christian
Action Committee put it during a 1981 Congressional hearing:
"Some opponents of tuition tax credits have made the charge that
the credit in some way subsidizes private schools. It does so no more
than a credit for home insulation subsidizes the insulation business.
It is in the public interest to have people insulate their homes.""
What presumption underlies these claims? When defenders of
aid-whether busing or textbooks or tuition tax credits or anything
else-argue that it goes to purposes or serves interests better
understood as public rather than private, what they are essentially
28. 330 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1947).
29. 392 U.S. 236,239 (1968).
30. Tuition Tax Credits: Hearings on S.550 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt
Management of the Senate Comm. on Finance (Part 2 of 2), 97th Cong. 204 (1981) (statement
of William Billings) [hereinafter Tuition Tax Credits Hearings]; see also Roemer v. Board of
Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736,746 (1976) ("[Rleligious institutions need not be quarantined from
public benefits that are neutrally available to all.");Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (stating that New
Jersey "cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews,
Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because oftheir
faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation"); Cochran v.
Louisiana State Bd. ofEduc., 281 U.S. 370,375 (1930) ("Viewing the statute [providing state-
supported busing to parochial school students] as having the effect thus attributed to it, we
cannot doubt that the taxing power of the state is exerted for a public purpose."); Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 350 F. Supp. 655, 658, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(stating that "it is the primary responsibility of the state to ensure the health, welfare and
safety of children attending both public and nonpublic schools"; aid to parochial schools for,
inter alia, janitorial and maintenance services is "public welfare legislation").
1448 [Vol. 42:1437
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doing is analogizing to other services the state provides parochial
schools and to which few object, because the state so clearly has a
"public welfare" interest in supplying them."1 In Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District, where the Court upheld state provision of
an interpreter for a deaf student attending parochial school, it
declared:
We have never said that "religious institutions are disabled -
by the First Amendment from participating in publicly
sponsored social welfare programs." For if the Establishment
Clause did bar religious groups from receiving general
government benefits, then "a church could not be protected by
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk kept
in repair."32
Likewise with state-supported busing for parochial school students:
"[Tihe transportation of children to school [is] general welfare
legislation similar to providing police and fire protection .... "
Similarly, publicly provided textbooks for parochial schools are like
"public provision of police and fire protection, sewage facilities, and
streets and sidewalks."34
In sum, when they try to claim that aid for parochial schools is
going for a public and not a private purpose, aid defenders conceive
it as "analogous to the provision of services such as police and fire
protection, sewage disposal, highways, and sidewalks for parochial
schools.""5 Conversely, when aid defenders urge that the money in
31. See Rhoades v. School Dist., 226 A.2d 53, 62 (Pa. 1967).
32. 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) (quoting Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609 (1998), and
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,274-75 (1981)).
33. MargaretA. Nero, Case Comment, The ClevelandScholarshipandTutoringProgram..
Why VoucherProgramsDo Not Violate the Establishment Clause, 58 OHiO ST. L.J. 1103,1113
(1997).
34. Allen, 392 U.S. at 242.
35. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 781 (1973) (citing Everson, 330
U.S. at 17-18); see also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274-75 ("If the Establishment Clause barred the
extension of general benefits to religious groups, 'a church could not be protected by the
police and fire departmen .... " (quoting Roemer, 426 U.S. at 747)); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at
820-21 (White, J., dissenting) ("States do, and they may, furnish churches and parochial
schools with police and fire protection as well as water and sewage facilities."); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,671 (1970) (NA]id' to schools teaching a particular religious faith [is
no] more a violation of the Establishment Clause than providing 'state-paid policemen,
detailed to protect children [at the schools] from the very real hazards of traffic.")
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question really is no longer the public's but rests in private control,
they liken it to social security checks or Pell grants, money that
may originate in the state treasury but the expenditure of which we
clearly think of as private.36
And just as it does not matter if the aid actually never goes
through private hands-it is private money as long as parents'
private choices direct it 7 -so, aid defenders claim, it does not
matter if it goes directly to a private school, as long as it serves
public purposes. The district court's decision in Lemon, for example,
upheld state programs under which parochial schools were
reimbursed for part of the salaries they paid to teachers of secular
subjects such as math and reading, on the grounds that "nonpublic
education, by providing instruction in secular subjects, contributes
significantly to the achievement of [a] public purpose. The
Legislature, therefore, concluded that it is a governmental duty to
support the achievement of this public welfare purpose by
supporting the purely secular objectives of nonpublic education."38
Likewise, in discussing Wolman, one commentator concluded that
"if the state could administer and grade state prepared exams for
private school students, then the state could reimburse the private
schools for performing the identical tasks."3 9 True, in such cases, it
is parochial schools that are providing the teaching and testing and
not the state, as with busing and textbooks. Yet the schools are
doing so, aid proponents claim, in a public role, in the way in which
any private entity might when the state contracts with it to provide
a public service. That does not mean that the money in
question-whether you want to call it public or private-is flowing
(alterations in original).
There is no dispute that churches may benefit, like any member of the public,
from many generally available government services .... Therefore, a city need
not exclude a church from city fire or police protection. This is true even though
a church's purely religious aims are more easily advanced when it need not
divert effort from the saving of souls to the prevention of fires.
Matthew S. Steffey, Redefining the Modern Constraints of the Establishment Clause:
Separable Principles of Equality, Subsidy, Endorsement, and Church Autonomy, 75 MARQ.
L. REv. 903, 918-19 (1992).
36. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
38. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35, 39 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
39. Segall, supra note 3, at 274 (discussing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)).
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to the support of private (religious) purposes, 0 or so aid defenders
say.
What, then, do aid opponents say in response? How do they claim
that the aid is in fact better understood as supporting private and
not public purposes? There are two possibilities, and
notwithstanding some considerable confusion on the matter, I claim
it is the second which aid opponents are better understood to be
arguing.
The first possibility is this: Aid opponents, in countering
proponents' assertions that the aid in question goes to public
purposes, argue, for example, that with state-provided counselling
services, state-financed remedial instruction, state loans of
equipment and materials such as projectors or maps, or state
subsidies for field trips, it is in fact impossible to ensure the aid's
restriction to public, as opposed to private or sectarian, purposes.
In each such instance, aid opponents urge, teachers or other
personnel have the discretion to use the publicly subsidized aid to
convey a private sectarian message, even if unconsciously or
unintentionally. A projector can be used to show religious films; a
map might help illustrate Biblical claims; counselling can refer to
theological sources of psychological support; and a field trip to the
zoo can, enpassants be made the occasion for a creationist remark.
In all such cases, schools are "bound to mix religious teachings with
secular ones, not by conscious design, perhaps, but because the
mixture [is] inevitable."4
40. See Boris I. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285, 1286
(1969) (stating that, in defending tax concessions, governments have "often asserted that the
churches were carrying on activities that would otherwise have to be financed directly by the
state").
To the extent that sectarian schools, in the discharge of their secular
educational function, are spending dollars that would otherwise have to be
spent by government in the public schools, the sectarian schools are performing,
admittedly as volunteers, a public service. Accordingly, to that same extent,
government should have the power, at its discretion, to compensate sectarian
schools for the public service they have rendered ....
G. Sidney Buchanan, Governmental Aid to Sectarian Schools: A Study in Corrosive
Precedents, 15 Hous. L. REV. 783, 823 (1978).
41. Roemerv. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736,749 (1976); see also Wolman, 433 U.S.
247 ("[T]he therapist may establish a relationship with the pupil in which there might be
opportunities to transmit ideological views."); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 357 (1975)
(statingthat instructional equipment, such as projectors and record players, "from its nature
can be diverted to religious purposes" by a teacher); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618-
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The concern that certain types of aid, even if conceived with a
"public welfare" rationale, can be diverted to private sectarian
purposes, gains apparent credibility from the fact that where courts
have upheld government aid, they have seemingly done so where
the personnel administering the program act as mere conduits for
public purposes with no discretion to allow sectarian purposes to
seep into the secular activities being funded. "[U]nlike teaching and
counseling," for example, "diagnostic testing does not involve the
transmission of substantive views," and so "there [is] no danger of
a religious message being conveyed."42 Courts have likewise upheld
state-subsidized textbooks for parochial school students. Unlike a
map, which requires teacher expatiation and risks being channelled
to secular ends, the language in a textbook is immutable and can
verifiably be confined to a secular approach: "[Liegislatures can
require that texts deal only with subjects taught in public
schools."43 And unlike field trips, which are "components of teaching
in... pervasively religious school [s]" and which will "inevitably and
impermissibly" mix in religion, "busing on public routes to schools"
does not admit of the same danger.44 In all these cases, there is said
to be no "admixture" of public and private,45 no possibility that
these sorts of aid could serve private ends.46
19 (1971) (striking down Rhode Island's attempt to supplement the salaries of teachers of
secular subjects in public schools because even "[wlith the best of intentions such...
teacher[s] would find it hard to make a total separation between secular teaching and
religious doctrine").
42. Segall, supra note 3, at 272 (discussing Wolman, 433 U.S. at 241-43).
43. George Miller, Note, Tax Deductions for Parents of Children Attending Public and
Nonpublic Schools: Mueller v. Allen, 71 KY. L.J. 685, 689 (1982-83).
44. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2583, 2587 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
45. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 47 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
46.
[A] State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks that
contain maps of the United States, but the State may not lend maps of the
United States for use in geography class. A State may lend textbooks on
American colonial history, but it may not lend a film on George Washington, or
a film projector to show it in history class .... A State may pay for bus
transportation to religious schools but may not pay for bus transportation from
the parochial school to the public zoo or natural history museum for a field trip.
A State may pay for diagnostic services conducted in the parochial school but
therapeutic services must be given in a different building .... AState may give
cash to a parochial school to pay for the administration of state-written tests
and state-ordered reporting services, but it may not provide flmds for teacher-
prepared tests on secular subjects.
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The problem, however, is this: If what aid opponents are
understood to be saying is that, however public its intended
purpose, the contested aid is somehow vulnerable to a private-
sectarian "admixture" or religious "diversion," 47 then there is no
debate to be joined, for all aid is, in fact, so vulnerable. Indeed,
courts themselves risk incoherence if they are understood to be
drawing the line between maps, field trips, and counselling on the
one hand, and textbooks, busing, or testing on the other, on the
basis of the former's relative permeability to religious admixture
and its capacity to be diverted to private ends. As Justice Thomas
put it in Mitchell:
A concern for divertibility... is misplaced not only because it
fails to explain why the sort of aid that we have allowed is
permissible, but also because it is boundless-enveloping all
aid, no matter how trivial-and thus has only the most
attenuated (if any) link to any realistic concern for preventing
an "establishment of religion."5
Consider that, just like maps and charts, it is the individual
teacher who makes discussion of a textbook meaningful. Even
secular textbooks can be put to religious uses: "[it is hard toimagine any book that could not, in even moderately skilled hands,
serve to illustrate a religious message."49 Similarly, just like field
trips, bus transportation to school inevitably abets a religious
purpose. As Justice Rutledge declared in his Everson dissent:
Nor is there pretense that [busing] relates only to the secular
instruction given in religious schools... the very purpose of the
state's contribution is to defray the cost of conveying the pupil
to the place where he will receive not simply secular, but also
and primarily religious, teaching and guidance ... there is
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,110-11(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
47. See Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2583.
48. Id. at 2549.
49. Id; see also Public Funds for Pub. Schs. v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29, 36 (D.N.J.
1973) (noting that state aid for textbooks, inter alia, must ensure that the "materials
provided thereby [will] be used only for nonideological, secular purposes"); Segall, supra note
3, at 281 ("Whatever the establishment clause means, it cannot mean that a state can loan
a book to a private school student but not a map or chart....").
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undeniably an admixture of religious with secular teaching in
all such institutions. °
And in the same vein, "[plupil attendance reporting" at parochial
schools, which judges have allowed the state to subsidize, is just as
"essential to the schools' sectarian educational function as it is to
the secular aspect of the curriculum."5
True, there may be degrees to which any given bus, field trip,
book, map, or remedial or testing service is capable of mixing
private, sectarian with public, secular purposes. But as the Court
noted in Meek v. Pittenger: "The likelihood of inadvertent fostering
of religion may be less in a remedial arithmetic class than in a
medieval history seminar, but a diminished probability of
impermissible conduct is not sufficient."52
If we are to explain the courts' distinction between books, buses,
and counselling on the one hand, and maps, field trips, and testing
on the other, we will have to jettison the faulty argument that the
first set serve exclusively public secular purposes while private
sectarian purposes inevitably creep into the second. More to the
point, if we are looking for the grounds on which aid opponents and
proponents engage each other, we will have to look elsewhere,
because all aid is in fact permeable to private religious "admixture."
Fortunately, there is a second possibility. What aid opponents and
proponents are better conceived as arguing about is not whether a
particular service (busing, textbook-provision, therapeutic services,
counselling, etc.) allows for more or less sectarian seepage or
50. Everson, 330 U.S. at 46-47 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
51. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Levitt, 461 F. Supp. 1123, 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Ward,
J., dissenting).
52. 421 U.S. 349, 370-71 (1975). In his concurring opinion in Wolman, Justice Powell
stated that "[our decisions in this troubling area draw lines that often must seem arbitrary."
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262.(1977) (Powell, J., concurring). And as Seagall
elaborated:
To illustrate Justice Powells point, the Wolman Court held that textbooks could
be lent to private school children but not maps or charts. Furthermore, the
Court held that providing equipment and materials to children attending
religious schools constituted an unlawful subsidytothose schools, butproviding
remedial classroom instruction to private school children did not have the same
effect provided the instruction took place off the school grounds.
Segall, supra note 3, at 273 (footnotes omitted).
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diversion, but whether it falls under a sectarian school's respon-
sibility to provide.
Even aid that is relatively impermeable to sectarian admixture-
even aid that comes as close as possible to the purely secular-can
further a school's private purposes. For if it was the school's
responsibility to supply the service in question, however secular it
might be, then by relieving that responsibility, the aid allows the
school to free up funds that it can devote to religious purposes.5" As
Justice Douglas put it in his Lemon concurrence:
It matters not that the teacher receiving taxpayers' money only
teaches religion a fraction of the time. Nor does it matter that
he or she teaches no religion. The school is an organism living
on one budget. What the taxpayers give for salaries of those
who teach only the humanities or science without any trace of
proselytizing enables the school to use all of its own funds for
religious training.?
Or as G. Sidney Buchanan notes, "government dollars which
support the secular activities of religious entities enable those
organizations to support their religious activities with other
funds."5 In so doing, they "reliev[e] the sectarian school of costs it
otherwise would have borne in educating its students.""
53. For example, Justice Brennan's "position was that even if the secular educational
components could easily be separated from the religious activities of church-related schools,
they still could not constitutionally be aided." Morgan, supra note 3, at 68; see also Mitchell,
120 S. Ct. at 2549 ("It is perhaps conceivable that courts could take upon themselves the task
of distinguishing among the myriad kinds of possible aid based on the ease of diverting each
kind. But it escapes us how a court might coherently draw any such line.").
54. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 641 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
55. G. Sidney Buchanan, Governmental Aid to Religious Entities: The Total Subsidy
Position Prevails, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 53,84 (1989).
56. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 228 (1997). As Professor Choper notes, some say
that:
"since textbooks are used in the classrooms as an integral feature of the
educational process, there is no certainty that they would not be manipulated
for religious instruction in parochial schools." True. But even assuming that
similar manipulation could not occur with respect to state-provided school
lunches (by prayers in connection therewith, for example), or state-financed
school medical examinations (by their illustrative use in classroom theological
discussions), or state-laid sidewalks providing access to the denominational
school, the point is not well taken. Even public aid that is itself immune from
sectarian manipulation frees church funds either for uses subject to
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Consequently, where courts have deemed state-supported aid to
be part and parcel of the school's responsibility to defray, they have
prohibited its being provided by the state, no matter how relatively
secular the aid is. In Meek and Ball, where the aid at issue-salary
support for teachers, and assistance for basic instructional
equipment and material--"in effect subsidize[dl the religious
functions of the parochial schools by taking over a substantial
portion of their responsibility for teaching secular subjects,"" the
programs were stricken. In the district-levelNyquist decision, along
similar lines, the court struck down state subsidies for janitorial
and snow-removal services in parochial schools, notwithstanding
the fact that such services are as close to purely secular as
possible-that is, they are impervious to religious seepage. 58 "The
argument is made," the court said, "that since janitorial functions
and snow removal obviously are not the teaching of religion, their
neutral character permits a benevolent grant for these purposes
from the tax raised funds in the State Treasury."59 The court found,
however, that such an argument wrongly assumes "that a parochial
school budget is divisible. It rejects the argument that once a public
subsidy is given it lightens the burden on the rest of the budget and
even permits more of the other private money to be used for
religious instruction.' s
manipulation, or for strictly religious uses. This being so, the attempted
limitation only formalistically accomplishes the end sought.
Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CAL. L. REV.
260, 326 (1968) (footnote omitted).
57. School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997).
58. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 350 F. Supp. 655, 665
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
59. Id.
60. Id.; see also Gatton v. Goff, Nos. 96CVH-01-193, 96CVH-01-721,1996 WL 466499, at
*10 (Ohio C.P. July 31, 1996), quoted in Suzanne H. Bauknight, The Search for
Constitutional School Choice, 27 J. LAw & EDUC. 525, 546 (1998) (The common deciding
factor in these cases appears to have been that in each program, the state aid provided to the
private schools made it possible for them to fulfill their secular functions, while making
additional money available to fund their religious functions."); Michael J. Stick, Educational
Vouchers: A Constitutional Analysis, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 423, 470, n.323 (1995)
("In other instances, however, nonsectarian aid may not benefit religious schools in such a
way. If aid were earmarked toward a secular service that religious schools would not
otherwise provide, then this aid would not furnish the schools with additional fimding for
religious purposes.").
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On the other hand, just as state aid to essentially secular
activities might assist the school's religious purposes by relieving
the school of a financial responsibility it would otherwise bear, so
aid to activities into which sectarianism can deeply permeate has
been upheld as long as the court deems those activities not to have
been a parochial school responsibility. In Zobrest, which dealt with
a program under which the state paid for a sign language
interpreter for a deaf student attending the parochial Salpointe
School,"' surely the intepreter would not have been able to avoid the
seepage of religious influence into her communications. As the
Supreme Court later said of the Zobrest case, "we allowed the State
to provide an interpreter, even though she would be a mouthpiece
for religious instruction." 2 Even so, the Court declared, the
extension of state aid for interpretive services did not amount to
"'an impermissible direct subsidy' of Salpointe, for Salpointe is not
relieved of an expense that it otherwise would have assumed in
educating its students."" Likewise with the remedial instructional
services at issue inAgostini, into which sectarian influences clearly
could creep: "The Court... took pains to identify the limits of its
holding, emphasizing that.., the services... did not supplant the
school's ordinary educational functions or relieve it of costs it would
otherwise have borne in the student's education."64
So, too, with state provision of certain kinds of instructional
materials. The Circuit Court of Appeals in Mueller v. Allen allowed
tax concessions for student purchases of tennis shoes and rulers,
while striking them down for maps and globes.65 It was not that
rulers or even tennis shoes are incapable of being used for sectarian
purposes-a ruler can be used to "measure mileage on a biblical
map"'6 6-or that maps and globes are more readily bent to parochial
61. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1993).
62. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226; see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d
1190, 1192 (1992) ("Salpointe is a pervasively religious institution... Salpointe 'encourages
its faculty to assist students in experiencing how the presence of God is manifest in nature,
human history, in the struggles for economic and political justice, and other secular areas
of the curriculum.').
63. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12 (quoting Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind,
474 U.S. 481,487 (1986)).
64. Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127, 142 (Me. 1999) (describingAgostini).
65. 676 F.2d 1195, 1201-02 (8th Cir. 1982).
66. Id at 1202 n.14.
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ends. Rather, it was that "[t]he needs of the institution from the
standpoint of instructional materials and equipment are distinct
from the needs of the student," and while state aid for instructional
materials and equipment useful to schools, e.g., maps and globes,
would relieve a school obligation and so free up funds for sectarian
purposes, aid that is useful to students, e.g., rulers and tennis
shoes, relieves-if anything-a parental obligation, and so frees up
no school funds for sectarian purposes.67
The question of whether aid flows to public or private purposes,
then, comes down to the question of whether it defrays something
that is better understood as a responsibility of the parochial school,
regardless of how secular that thing might be, or whether it is
better understood as something the parochial school is not obligated
to supply, even though it may allow for considerable religious
seepage. It is not, in other words, their permeability to sectarian
influences versus their hermetically sealed secular nature that
distinguishes prohibited maps, globes, and field trips from
permissible busing, textbooks, and interpreters. It is, rather, their
67. Id. at 1202. In discussing the Supreme Courts decision in Mueller, Justice Thomas
acknowledged in Mitchell the dissents point that the "instructional materials which are
subsidized by the Minnesota tax deduction plainly may be used to inculcate religious values
and belief," yet upheld the aid anyway. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2547 (2000)
(quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 414 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). In Cochran v.
Louisiana State Board ofEducation, the Court upheld a state program that purchased school
books for children attending both public and private schools because the costs assumed by
the state were generally borne by the parents rather than the school: "The schools... are
not the beneficiaries of these appropriations... nor are they relieved of a single obligation,
because of them." 281 U.S. 370, 375 (1930). The Court reasoned:
True, these children attend some school, public or private, the latter, sectarian
or non-sectarian, and that the books are to be furnished them for their use, free
of cost, whichever they attend. The schools, however, are not the beneficiaries
of these appropriations. They obtain nothing from them, nor are they relieved
of a single obligation, because of them. The school children and the state alone
are the beneficiaries.
Id.; see also Meek v. Pittenger, 374 F. Supp. 639, 675 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting) ("A cardinal distinction between approving the loaning of secular books and the
banning of instructional materials would be that ostensibly books are given directly to the
children and derivatively the benefits are extended to their parents .... ."); Visser v.
Nooksack Valley Sch. Dist., 207 P.2d 198, 202 (Wash. 1949) (upholding publicly paid
"transportation of pupils to and from the Christian school" because it "is of no benefit to the
school itself... the transportation of pupils to and from the school inures exclusively to the
benefit of the pupils and their parents, in that it simply relieves them from the obligation
incident to compulsory attendance statutes of providing transportation themselves").
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relative tendency to fall within or outside of the school's sphere of
responsibility. In the first set of cases-e.g., maps, globes, and field
trips-courts have deemed that the aid saved the school money that
it could then devote to private purposes. In the second set of
cases-e.g., busing, textbooks, and interpreters-courts determined
that by relieving no responsibility that the school would otherwise
have been shouldering, the aid had no effect in creating any new
quantum of religious influence and so remained devoted to broader
public purposes.
C. Mitchell's Confusion
In Mitchell, the most recent Supreme Court parochial-school aid
case, the Court upheld federal instructional-equipment aid for
parochial schools.6" Justice Thomas, writing for the plurality,
convincingly dismissed the criterion of relative permeability to
religious influence-or what he called "divertibility"-as a way of
explaining what kind of aid the Court has upheld and what it has
struck down. 9 In part, he did so because as long as the aid money
can be deemed private-as long as it creates no "impermissible
incentive" to choose private school-thenit does not matter whether
the purposes it serves are, because of divertibility, also private:
"[Alny use of that aid to indoctrinate cannot be attributed to the
government and is thus not of constitutional concern."
0
Justice Thomas, however, also introduced a wholly new criterion
that is meant to trump "divertibility": the criterion of
"impermissible content," according to which aid is impermissible
only if it actually contains a religious message.7 So, for example,
state funding for a textbook with a sectarian message would be
impermissible, but state support for teachers of secular remedial
classes at parochial schools-who presumably don't have sectarian
messages stamped on their foreheads-would be permissible.' The
problem, however, is that while Justice Thomas purported to derive
his impermissible content criterion-which has never before
68. See Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2536-37.
69. See id. at 2547.
70. Id.
71. See i. at 2548.
72. See id. at 2548-49.
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appeared in Court decisions-from "recent precedents," and while
he believed that it explains "the sort of aid that we have allowed," 3
it in fact explains Supreme Court decisions even more poorly than
does the divertibility/permeability criterion, let alone the "school
responsibility" criterion.
Justice Thomas' "content" criterion fails, for example, to explain
why aid for field trips, maps, and globes-none of which on their
own face need display religious content-have been struck down.
This is presumably why Justice Thomas says that Meek and
Wolman-which struck down state provision of maps, globes, and
other instructional equipment--created an inexplicable rift within
[the Court's] Establishment Clause jurisprudence." 4 But in fact
they are "inexplicable" only on Justice Thomas' "content" criterion,
which would strike down only that aid which carries an explicit
sectarian content; Meek and Wolman are fully explicable on a
criterion by which courts strike down aid that is deemed to fall
within the school's responsibility to provide. Or, put another way,
while it is true, as Justice O'Connor says, that Meek and Wolman
struck down aid for instructional materials such as maps and
globes while the Mitchell Court upheld "similar" programs, there is
no need to regard the cases as inconsistent.75 The state-financed
instructional material at issue in Meek and Wolman were not
explicitly supplemental to private school responsibilities; hence, on
some understandings they might well have supplanted some funds
parochial schools would have devoted to the purchase of such
materials, freeing up funds that the schools could then devote to
sectarian purposes. In Mitchell, although the aid was substantively
the same, the Court accepted that it was explicitly supplemental,
falling as it did under Chapter Two of the Education Consolidation
and Improvement Act,76 thus relieving parochial schools of no
financial responsibilities that they would otherwise be shouldering.
Notably, in a footnote to his plurality opinion, Justice Thomas
concedes that the question of whether aid "supplants, rather than
supplements, the core educational function of parochial schools"--in
other words, whether it supports a service that falls within or
73. Id. at 2549.
74. Id. at 2563.
75. See id. at 2563-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
76. Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357, 469 (1981); Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2536-37.
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outside the school's responsibility-"maybe relevant to determining
whether aid" serves religious purposes.77 He does not pursue
discussion of this criterion only because, "to the extent that the
supplementlsupplant line is separable from... [the divertibility
criterion]," the court does not "need to resolve the distinction's
constitutional status today, for, as we have already noted, [the
Chapter Two program] itself requires that aid may only be
supplemental."
78
Equally notably, in her Mitchell concurrence, in which she was
joined by Justice Breyer, Justice O'Connor completely ignored
Justice Thomas' "content" criterion, upholding the Chapter Two aid
for two reasons. First, Justice O'Connor noted that the aid "is
available to assist students regardless of whether they attend
public or private non-profit religious schools' 79--in other words, the
aid money is private and not public because it's controlled by
parental choice and comes with no state-imposed incentives to go
private. Second, she noted that the aid "only... supplement[s] the
funds otherwise available to a religious school"-in other words, it
serves exclusively public purposes because it relieves the school of
no responsibility, and so affords it no new money which it can
devote to private purposes. 0
But of course, the question of what constitutes a school's
responsibility is by no means incontestable. Though courts have
given answers to it in the specific cases discussed so far, dissents
have been heated. Following my purposes here, which assume that
in this area, today's dissent could be tomorrow's majority, I treat
this very much as an open question."1 My aim is not to conclude
77. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2544 n.7.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2562 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
80. Id. Or, as the New York Times put it, the opinion by "Justice Clarence Thomas...
would have made 'the principle of... private choice' the only touchstone for channeling aid
to religious schools"--in other words, it addressed only the question of whether the money
was private or public. Greenhouse, supra note 11, at A27. "But Justice Thomas's opinion was
qualified by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's insistence in a concurring opinion that public aid
may supplement, but must not supplant, moneythat a religious school could otherwise spend
on its own programs." Id. In other words, the question of whether the aid ultimately abets
private purposes through relieving school responsibility, or remains consigned to public
purposes, is also crucial.
81. See, e.g., Wolmanv. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,258 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring inpart
and dissenting in part), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000). Marshall
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that the issue is settled, much less to settle it myself; rather, I look
at how both sides-aid proponents and aid opponents-go about
arguing the question of whether the particular service at issue is
one for which parochial schools should be thought of as responsible.
I will call this the question of fungibility, the question of whether
the aid is "fungible... because the funds can be used for religious
education."82 In other words, because by providing money the
school would otherwise have been responsible for spending in one
area, it frees up the same amount to be spent in another.
D. The Existential Versus the Normative
Aid, if it is understood as public money serving the private
purposes of parochial schools, risks violating the Establishment
Clause. If, however, that money is understood as private, or those
purposes as public, then it does not. But when does it become more
reasonable to understand the money in question as private, not
public? And when is it more plausible to construe the purposes in
question as public, not private? At rock bottom, this is what debate
over the Establishment Clause is about.
Part II looks at discourse over whether the money is private or
public by examining how each side argues the question of whether
incentives constrain the choice of parents so tightly that they cease
to be genuine private agents and instead become mere conduits for
what remains essentially public, state-controlled money. Part IH
looks at debate over whether the purposes to which that money goes
are better understood as public or private, by examining how each
side argues the'question of whether the aid can be understood to
relieve a school responsibility and is therefore fungible-capable of
freeing up funds with which the school can pursue private
states:
It is, of course, unquestionable that textbooks are central to the educational
process. Under the rationale of Meek, therefore, they should not be provided by
the State to sectarian schools because "[slubstantial aid to the educational
function of such schools ... necessarily results in aid to the sectarian school
enterprise as a whole."
Id- (quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975)) (citations omitted).
82. Steven K. Green, The Legal Argument Against Private School Choice, 62 U. CIN. L.
Rsv. 37, 49 (1993).
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purposes-or whether it does not relieve any school responsibility,
and therefore confines itself to its original public purposes."
More specifically, in Part II, I show that in arguing that the
moneyis public, aid opponents at rock bottom adopt what I will call
an "existential" perspective concerning baseline government
responsibilities. By contrast, aid defenders, in deeming the money
to be private, adopt what I will term a competing "normative"
approach to the appropriate baseline government responsibilities.
In Part III, however, I demonstrate that in arguing that the
purposes the money serves are private, aid opponents switch to the
normative viewpoint which they dismiss in labelling the money
itself public. And, conversely, in deeming those purposes public, aid
proponents adopt the existential point of view which they shun in
arguing that the money itself is private. 4
II. MONEY: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE?
Money from the state is deemed private if private
choice-unfettered parental discretion-controls its disposition. If,
however, it comes with state-structured incentives, inducements or
other kinds of constraints that channel its disposition in certain
directions, then it remains public money. On this, both aid
opponents and aid proponents agree. Where they disagree is how to
apply this distinction. And, consequently, they part ways over
whether a particular aid program in fact creates a financial
incentive for students to undertake a sectarian education.
True, in a sense all aid for an educational purpose-whether for
textbooks, school busing, remedial instruction or testing-is state-
directed or constrained in that it is aid for an educational purpose
and thus cannot be spent for noneducational ends. What we are
looking for, consequently, is the presence or absence of some further
kind of encumbrance on private discretion. Specifically, what we are
asking is whether the aid is structured so as to provide parents
83. To "say that [aid is] for public purposes" is simply "to say that [it is] not for religious
ones [or for] the private character of the function of religious education." Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 51 (1947).
84. The notion of "baseline" has gained some scholarly attention lately, notably as a
result of the work of Cass Sunstein. I relate my own approach to that discussion, infra notes
181-94 and accompanying text.
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with an incentive to send their children to private (and hence
parochial) as opposed to public school, or whether it is better
understood as providing no such skewing or thumb on the scale.
Here, at the very core of their argumentation, aid opponents
adopt what might be called an "existential" approach. Taking the
immediately preexisting budgetary and policy status quo as a
baseline, they then ask whether the new aid package will induce
any kind of departure from it in the direction of private school. Aid
defenders, in countering, urge a "normative" approach to the
baseline, arguing that one simply cannot look at whether the aid
tends to alter the situation in favor of private schools by comparison
with whatever the immediately preexisting status quo may have
been. Rather, one must strip away what existed immediately prior,
reaching farther back to some kind of theoretically grounded or
historically significant baseline. Only then can one ask
whether-when taken together with any support that exists for
public schools beyond that baseline-the proposed aid to private
education will skew parental choice in favor of the latter. It is
remarkable how consistently and completely this existential-
normative distinction explains the competing rhetoric uttered on
the question of whether the aid provides any kind of skewing
incentive in the direction of private schools-or, in other words, the
question of whether the program's money is better understood as
private or public, controlled more by parents or by the state.
A Aid Opponents: An Existential Approach
To see this, begin with the one assumption universally at play
and underpinning the argumentation of aid opponents. It is that
any proposed new program that would direct some additional aid to
private schools-even if comparable aid is already available to
public schools through another program-provides an incentive for
parents to patronize private schools, because it disturbs an
immediately preexistingbaseline. Compared to the status quo ante,
at least some new parents have a greater incentive than they had
before to send their children to private school.
This assumption of course takes its most readily understandable
form when the program does in fact confine itself only to private
school students. When eligibility for aid is "contingent upon
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attendance at private schools," as one commentator puts it, that aid
"by necessity, creates the impermissible 'financial incentive for
students to undertake sectarian education." 5 As the Sloan Court
explained in a case involving tuition tax concessions to private
school parents, in such situations, "It]he State has singled out a
class of its citizens for a special economic benefit," thus providing
"an incentive to parents to send their children to sectarian
schools"88 ; "at bottom its intended consequence is to preserve and
support religion-oriented institutions."87
The idea here, it bears emphasizing, is that any such departure
from the immediately preexisting status quo-whatever that status
quo may have been-is sufficient to create a de novo incentive that
skews individual parental choice away from public and toward
private schools. As Chief Justice Burger put it in Lemon, "[w]e have
no long history of state aid to church-related educational
institutions comparable to 200 years of tax exemption for churches";
what matters is that "the state programs before us today represent
something of an innovation."8 The words "today" and "innovation"
are key. Or, as one commentator has put it, any voucher plan,
directed as it would be exclusively at private school parents,
"clearly increases the financial incentive to choose religious schools
by lowering their price [and] significantly chang[ing] the price
structure of the available options. Under [a] voucher plan, religious
education would be significantly cheaper than it is at present."9
Here, the words "change" and "at present" are key. What the plan
85. Green, supra note 82, at 67 (quoting Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986)).
86. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825,832 (1973).
87. I& at 832-33; see also Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. School
Dist., 718 F.2d 1389, 1399 (6th Cir. 1983) ("The Grand Rapids program. .. directly benefits
nonpublic school students, and hence, nonpublic schools, while at the same time it excludes
members of the public at large."), affd, School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373
(1985); Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399,412 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (striking down a program
oftuition reimbursement to parents ofstudents attendingprivate elementary and secondary
schools because "[t]he reimbursement grant [is] directed only towards the parents of children
who attend non-public schools").
88. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971).
89. David Futterman, Note, School Choice and the Religion Clauses: The Law and
Politics of Public Aid to Private Parochial Schools, 81 GEo. L.J. 711, 728 (1993).
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does is to change the present, the immediately preexisting status
quo, creating an incentive to go private."
Even if another near-identical program exists for public school
students and their parents, that is insufficient to eliminate the
incentive effect, according to the opponents. The proper baseline is
not some normative plane of prior equality, such that if the state at
one point provided a program for public school students-say
busing-and then later on established a comparable private school
program, no skewing incentive either way would be deemed to have
been created. Rather, for aid opponents, the proper baseline is
whatever immediately preceded the introduction of the private-
oriented program, even if what existed previously included
comparable, or for that matter, more significant aid to the public
system. From this kind of existential baseline, obviously, anything
that favors private school students creates an incentive that
deviates from it. 9
Consider some representative arguments. The Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program (MPCP) was designed to provide state
vouchers for private school parents in the same way as (or more
exactly, to a smaller degree than) the state supports public
schools.' By merely countervailing state aid to public schools, aid
defenders argued, MPCP's private school vouchers presented
parents with an incentiveless "wash" between public and private
venues.9" On this reading, the program represented an option-
expanding "attempt to enhance the opportunities of the poor to
choose" in an unfettered way "between public and nonpublic
education."' But for opponents, such an argument 'proves too
much"' because it would "justify subsidizing religious schools
90. See Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (D. Minn.
1978) (noting that one of the reasons the Supreme Court struck down programs such as the
tuition tax credits featured in Nyquist is because of their "recent vintage," whereas in Walz,
the contested property tax exemptions for religious institutions were upheld because they
had been in existence "for many years").
91. See, e.g., Juddv. Board ofEduc., 15 N.E.2d 576, 582 (N.Y. 1938) ("Free transportation
of pupils induces attendance at the school.").
92. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 608-09 (Wis. 1998).
93. See id. at 617-18; Case Comment, Establishment Clause-School Vouchers-
Wisconsin Supreme Court Upholds MilwaukeeParental Choice Program-Jacksonv. Benson,
112 HARv. L. REv. 737, 740 (1999).
94. See Case Comment supra note 93, at 740 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973)).
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completely, as if such aid would be neutral taken together with
state funding of the public schools--'a result wholly at variance
with the Establishment Clause."' Instead, opponents argued,
better to treat the voucher program as a departure from the
immediately preexisting status quo-however much, by some
normative measure, the status quo already favors public
schools-and hence as an incentive to attend private 'school.
In exactly the same vein, the Nyquist Court had the following to
say about New York's challenged tuition tax credits for parents
with children attending private school:
We do not agree with the suggestion in the dissent of The Chief
Justice that tuition grants are... analogous [to] comparable
benefits to ... public ... schools. The grants to parents of
private school children are given in addition to the right that
they have to send their children to public schools "totally at
state expense." And in any event, the argument proves too
much, for it would also provide a basis for approving through
tuition grants the complete subsidization of all religious schools
on the ground that such action is necessary if the State is fully
to equalize the position of parents who elect such schools-a
result wholly at variance with the Establishment Clause.
9 6
The proper baseline, in other words, is the immediately preexisting
status quo to which the tuition aid represents a pivotal
"addition--a new incentive. It is not some prior point from which
state-supported public education and the new tuition grants for
private schools would counterbalance one another, such that for
parents it would have become a wash with the state supplying no
incentive influencing parental choice between public and private
one way or the other."
95. Id. (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38).
96. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38 (citation omitted).
97. See Evan M. Tager, Note, The Supreme Court, Effect Inquiry, and Aid to Parochial
Education, 37 STAN. L. REV. 219, 228-29 (1984). The author states:
In three different cases the Court upheld programs the beneficiaries of which
were private school students, rather than all students. It could be argued that
the classifications in these cases were narrow only because public school
students were already receiving the benefits in question and that therefore the
true class of beneficiaries effectively included "all schoolchildren." This
argument proves too much, however. The same reasoning could be used to
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Aid defenders claim that they are double taxed, paying for both
public and private education (through taxes in the first case, fees in
the second), and vouchers or tuition tax credits would simply even
the playing field based on some historical or theoretical baseline of
state neutrality. 9 8 Aid opponents turn an unsympathetic ear to this
claim. Instead, the status quo is the baseline, and any departure
from it creates new incentives to choose private schools. "Should we
relieve individuals of contributing to the support of public parks if
they never go to the park and, instead, give them financial
incentives for growing a piece of personal greenery?"99
B. Aid Proponents: A Normative Approach
Aid opponents, then, take an "existential" approach to the
incentive question-looking at the immediately preexisting status
quo and viewing any inducement to depart from it as a choice-
influencing incentive. That incentive takes the aids disposition out
of the unfettered discretion of private parties (parents) and places
it in the hands of the state; when a program "creates [a] financial
incentive for parents to choose a sectarian school," what we really
have is an instance of "state decisionmaking."00
Aid proponents, by contrast, adopt a normative approach, on
which the baseline is not the happenstance of whatever the
immediately preexisting empirical state of the world might have
been, but some theoretical or prior historical state. Against that
kind of a baseline, aid defenders invariably claim, a program of aid,
even if it focuses exclusively on private schools, comes with no
incentives that might encumber private choice because it is
permit the aid to parents struck down in Nyquist. Specifically, it could be
argued that because public school students are already entitled to a free
education, a law that provides private school students with a free education
does not involve a narrow classification.
Id. (footnote omitted).
98. Or, as Michael McConnell puts it, "[bly taxing everyone, but subsidizing only those
who use secular schools, the government creates a powerful disincentive for parents to
exercise their constitutionally protected option to send their children to parochial schools."
Michael McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CI. L. REv. 115, 132 (1992).
99. Tuition Tax Credit Hearings, supra note 30, at 396 (statement of the United Parents
Association of New York City).
100. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993).
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matched (and then some) by state aid to public schools. Hence the
money, free of any publicly imposed skewing effect, becomes wholly
privately controlled. For my purposes here, it does not matter what
this theoretical or historical baseline is, or what the rationales for
it (which are rarely if ever stated) might be. Although the anti-
incentive arguments of aid proponents might branch out into
numerous different theoretical or historical referents if one wanted
to coax them all out, at root what they share is precisely this
normative approach to the appropriate baseline from which to
measure incentives. Or, put another way, what they all reject is the
existential approach that aid opponents adopt.
Thus Jesse Choper describes his recommended doctrine, which
would allow the state to fund any amount of secular education in
parochial schools as long as it is coequal to what the state is
providing to public schools, as "both a traditional and normative"
one.'0 ' Traditional and normative because the appropriate
baseline-on which the state is providing no aid to either public or
private schools-is certainly drawn not from the existential present,
but rather is rooted in a particular historical starting point or is
otherwise normatively conceived. Along similar lines, consider the
following claim from a commentary on Justice Powell's decision in
Nyquist, which struck down a package of tuition tax benefits for
parents of private-school children. 2  Justice Powell, the
commentary complained, looked only at the newly provided benefits
to the private schools-he looked at the effect of the program in
isolation; from this perspective it naturally appeared as an
"incentive" to religious education.
This approach narrowed the scope of the neutrality inquiry
to the bounds of the single aid program in question; the overall
effect of the government's school financing programs-with its
disincentives as well as incentives to private education-was
not evaluated ....
101. Choper, supra note 56, at 340.
102. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 796-98
(1973).
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The Court's narrow definition of neutrality led it to
characterize the New York program as "advancing" religion and
thus nonneutral 0 3
In other words, a focus on the "newly provided benefits--a focus on
how the program caused a departure from what had previously
been the existing situation-led Justice Powell to see an "incentive"
in favor of public schools. For aid defenders, however, a more
appropriate focus would have required a stepping back, a viewing
of the new program from a theoretical or historical baseline from
which overall government programs in aid of public and private
education would be weighted against one another."0 4 It would, as
one legal scholar puts it, take into account that while "[slome of the
statutes presented to the Court have involved aid to... private
schools alone," they "often have been direct counterparts of
provisions for public schools," and "it is immaterial whether the aid
was made available to all schools through one statute or two."" 5
Likewise, in 1991 Eric Segall surveyed the post-Lemon raft of
Supreme Court school-aid cases dealing with new aid exclusively for
private school students and argued that "[iun none of the cases did
the government... provide a benefit to a religious school that was
not already provided to non-religious schools." 0 ' In so saying, Segall
in effect urged that the proper baseline is not the existent status
quo-from which any aid to private schools would induce
departures in their favor-but something historically antecedent to
or theoretically abstracted from that, such that the aid then granted
to public schools and now to private schools countervail one
another, creating no incentive one way or the other.
In the 1997 Cleveland voucher case, the pro-voucher side
complained that its opponents were urging the court to "examine
the scholarship program in isolation, as if it were enacted out of
whole cloth for the benefit of religious institutions."1 7 Instead, the
brief maintained, "the constitutional inquiry must encompass 'the
103. Government Neutrality, supra note 19, at 707 (footnote omitted).
104. See id.
105. Hugh F. Smart, Case Comment, Tax Deductions As Permissible State Aid to
Parochial Schools: Mueller v. Allen, 60 Cm.-KENT L. Rzv. 657, 677 (1984).
106. Segall, supra note 3, at 298-99.
107. Opening Brief ofAppellants/Cross-Appellees Hope for Cleveland's Children, et al. at
30, Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1997) (No. 97-1117).
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nature and consequences of the program viewed as a whole"'-that
is, not narrowly against a baseline of the immediate status quo
ante, but as part of a broader movement away from a baseline that
existed historically or is devised theoretically.'
Then-Professor Antonin Scalia gave the normative approach its
most explicit formulation when he told a 1981 Senate hearing on
tuition tax credits:
"The broadness" or "narrowness" of benefit coverage... should
be determined by the total scope of a logically and conceptually
unitary program, and not by the scope of one or another
individual amendment to it. For the "broadness" or
"narrowness" factor speaks to the presence or absence of
preferential purpose and effect, and it can hardly be called
preferential to add to an existing program a group that could
logically have been included there in the first place. That is to
say, far from being "preferential" to a class that is heavily
weighted toward church-related schools, the [tuition tax credit]
proposal would merely eliminate a pre-existing discrimination
against that class."
108. Id (quoting Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 492
(1986) (Powell, J., concurring)); see also School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,
375-76 (1985) (-Although Shared Time itself is a program offered only in the nonpublic
schools, there was testimony that the courses included in that program are offered, albeit
perhaps in a somewhat different form, in the public schools as well."). In Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, Chief Justice Burger argued:
The only discernible difference between the programs inEverson andAllen and
[the presentNyquist tuition tax credit case] is in the method of the distribution
of benefits: here the particular benefits of the... statutes are given only to
parents of private school children, while in Everson and Allen the statutory
benefits were made available to parents of both public and private school
children. But to regard that difference as constitutionally meaningful is to exalt
form over substance.
413 U.S. 756, 803 (1973) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Similarly,
then-Justice Rehnquist reasoned-
[Plarents [of private school students] are nonetheless compelled to support
public school services unused by them and to pay for their own children's
education. Rather than offering "an incentive to parents to send their children
to sectarian schools," as the majority suggests, New York is effectuating the
secular purpose of the equalization of the cost of educating New York children
that are borne by parents who send their children to nonpublic schools.
Id. at 812 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
109. Antonin Scalia, On Making it Look Easy by Doing it Wrong: A Critical View of the
Justice Department, in PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND THE PUBuC GOOD: POLICYALTERNATIVES FOR
THE EIGHTIES, 173, 179 (Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr. ed., 1981), reprinted in Tuition Tax
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Scalia's use of the words "logically and conceptually unitary
program" to describe his approach to the breadth or narrowness of
a particular program, and his rejection of the notion that any mere
addition "to an existing program" renders the aid narrowly focused
on whatever beneficiaries have been newly added, are about as
overt a revelation of the normative, anti-existentialist approach as
there is on the question of incentive. Or, as Justice Thomas put it
in his concurring opinion in Rosenberger, "[tihe constitutional
demands of the Establishment Clause may be judged against either
a baseline of 'neutrality' or a baseline of 'no aid to religion,' but the
appropriate baseline surely cannot depend on the fortuitous
circumstances"7-the existential state of the world-"surrounding
the form of aid."1 '
The "normative" approach that aid proponents take also provides
them an answer to the "proves too much" argument mounted by aid
opponents-namely, that a theoretical or historical baseline of no
public school aid at all would justify complete state funding of
private schools. After all, such funding would simply
"counterbalance" the massive aid the state already gives to public
schools, thus creating no "overall" incentive for parents to choose
private schools. In other words, the normative baseline approach:
Credits Hearings, supra note 30, at 570.
110. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 826 (1995) (Thomas,
J., concurring). In Meek v. Pittenger, the Court struck down programs that provided
equipment and instructional material to private schools that the state had long furnished to
public schools. 421 U.S. 349 (1975). Then-Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, said the following-
If the number of sectarian schools [benefitted by the program] were measured
as a percentage of all schools, public and private, then no doubt the majority
would conclude that the primary effect of the instructional materials and
equipment program is not to advance religion. One looks in vain, however, for
an explanation of the majority's selection of the number of private schools as
the denominator in its instructional materials and equipment calculations. The
only apparent explanation might be that [the aid program] applies only to
private schools while different legislation provides equipment and materials to
public schools. But surely this is not a satisfactory explanation, for the plurality
tells us, in connection with its discussion of the textbook loan program [which
it approved] that "it is of no constitutional significance whether the general
program is codified in one statute or two." We are left with no explanation for
the arbitrary course chosen.
Id. at 389-90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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proves too much, for it would... provide a basis for approving
through tuition grants the complete subsidization of all religious
schools on the ground that such action is necessary ifthe State
is fully to equalize the position of parents who elect such
schools-a result wholly at variance with the Establishment
Clause.'
In response, aid advocates might deny that they have no stopping
point-that they must therefore advocate complete subsidization of
private schools. It depends entirely on the norm they use. Perhaps
the norm holds that private school parents should get some subsidy
for relieving a burden on the public treasury, a principle that would
be defeated were they to get complete subsidization." Or perhaps
aid advocates might simply temper the logic of their normative
approach with a concern about the erosion of church-state
separation that full public funding of private schools would imply. "
Finally, it is also possible that some aid proponents might simply
embrace, unflinchingly, full public funding of private schools'
secular teaching requirements. Recall that Choper describes his
approach, which would allow the state to fund any amount of
secular education in religious schools as long as it was co-equal to
what the state was providing in public schools, as "both a
traditional and a normative" one." Choper, in essence, simply
rejects the premise of the "proves too much" attack, denying that
111. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38.
112. See id at 812 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part) ("New York has recognized that
parents who are sending their children to nonpublic schools are rendering the State a service
by decreasing the costs of public education and by physically relieving an already
overburdened public school system.").
113.
A compromise is indeed possible .... For any program of aid to religion, a court
can balance the degree of burden that is being alleviated against the additional
separation problems that are created and decide to what extent each principle
should be compromised. A court could approve a certain plan that only partially
alleviated burdens on the choice of religious schooling on the ground that the
program only slightly infringed the separation [of church and state]....
[Clomplete government subsidization of all schools, religious as well as
secular, would provide neutrality by making all schools equally attractive
economically, but the problem of church-state involvement would be
overwhelming.
Government Neutrality, supra note 19, at 708, 713.
114. Choper, supra note 56, at 340.
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full state funding of the secular teaching mission of parochial
schools violates the Establishment Clause because the aid,
understood against the appropriate historical or theoretical
baseline, creates no incentives to choose private over public. After
all, on this argument the money is privately, not publicly controlled.
C. Even-Handed Programs
Thus far, I have looked only at programs-textbook provision,
tuition tax credits, vouchers-that provide some new form of aid
only to private schools (even if comparable aid was already being
furnished to public schools). And I have shown how aid opponents,
using an existential criterion, invariably find a pro-private incentive
while aid defenders, using a normative standard, inevitably do not.
But some new programs-such as Title I aid for needy students,
Title II aid for instructional material, or IDEA support for
interpretive services-were conceived de novo as assistance for both
public and private school students." 5
Here, one might almost expect aid proponents to take an
existential approach. There is, after all, a sense in which new aid to
both public and private-school students furnishes no new relative
incentive for parents to choose private school-even by comparison
with the immediately preexisting status quo-because whatever
new inducements the aid creates to "go private" are offset by
equally available new incentives to "go public"; hence it in no way
intrudes state manipulation into parental choice. But interestingly,
even here aid opponents continue their existential approach, while
aid proponents persist with their normative arguments.
To see this, consider Witters v. Washington Department of
Services for the Blind, a case much cited in discourse over state aid
to parochial schools." 6 In Witters, the Court upheld a Washington
state program, available to both public and private college students,
under which Witters, suffering from a progressive eye condition,
received assistance to study at a parochial college to become a
115. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1491n (1994);
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-8962 (1994)).
116. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
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pastor.' Justice Powell, in concurring, gave a revealing critique of
the Supreme Court of Washington, which had struck down the
program as violative of the Establishment Clause. "The Washington
Supreme Court," Powell wrote, "found that the program had the
practical effect of aiding religion. In effect, the court analyzed the
case as if the Washington Legislature had passed a private bill that
awarded petitioner free tuition to pursue religious studies.""
8
Justice Powell's remarks are telling. Instead of viewing the
program as one that evenhandedly favored both public and private
school students, aid opponents simply treated it as if it benefitted
only private-school students. In other words, what the Supreme
Court of Washington did-and what aid opponents invariably do in
such situations-is willfully view the aid, even though available to
both public and private students, as if it were like all the other aid
packages discussed above: available only to private-school students
and hence, on existential terms, creating a new incentive to go
private. Justice Souter, reasoning along the same lines as the
Supreme Court of Washington in his Rosenberger dissent, wrote
that programs that aid both public and private school students
"cannot be lifted to a higher plane of generalization--a plane that
recognizes their normative evenhandedness-without admitting
that new economic benefits are being extended directly to
religion.""19 "[Elvenhanded availability," Justice Souter declared, "is
not by itself enough to satisfy constitutional requirements for any
aid scheme that results in a benefit to religion."
20
If aid opponents continue to find a new existential incentive to
go private-even in neutral public-private aid packages-then it
should not be surprising that aid proponents, in denying the
presence of incentive in such even-handed packages, are driven to
continue their normative, antieistentialist stance. Nowhere is this
more apparent than in Justice Thomas' Mitchell opinion, in which
he discussed Chapter Two aid for computers and other materials for
both public and private schools. 2 Justice Thomas declared:
117. See id. at 482.
118. Id. at 492 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
119. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819,889 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
120. Id. at 864.
121. See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2543-44, 2552-53 (2000).
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[What should be obvious [is] that simply because an aid
program offers private schools, and thus religious schools, a
benefit that they did not previously receive does not mean that
the program... creates... an "incentive" for parents to choose
such an education for their children. For any aid will have some
such effect.... Private decisionmaldng controls because of the
... program's neutrality.122
Justice Thomas is prepared to concede to aid opponents that by
their existential criterion-going by what parents "previously
receive [d]"--Chapter Two creates an incentive to go private. But
what counts is the program's own normative evenhandedness or
neutrality between public and private, judged, necessarily, against
a theoretical or historical baseline of deeper neutrality from which
public schools, by virtue of the significant state support they get
elsewhere, have already departed."'
In sum, although each side conceivably has a choice of weapons
when it comes to programs that aid both public and private schools
evenhandedly, aid opponents still choose the existential approach,
focusing on the benefits, and hence incentives, such new programs
provide for private school students, while aid proponents, conceding
the existential criterion to opponents, wrap themselves more in
normative rhetoric.
2 4
122. Id. at 2543-44.
123. Likewise, the court in Simmons-Harris v. Zelman-along Justice Souter's lines in
Rosenberger and the Supreme Court of Washington's in Witters, see supra notes 116-20 and
accompanying text-struck down a Cleveland voucher program even though it was part of
a broader package of aid to community schools:
Should we consider the Community Schools program in our analysis of the
constitutionality of the school voucher program, we would open the door to a
wide-reaching analysis which would permit us to consider any and all
scholarship programs available to children who qualify for the school voucher
program: we would be considering and comparing every available option for
Cleveland children. . . .we must limit ourselves to [the voucher] issue,
regardless of the temptations Defendants' arguments present.
Nos. 00-3055/3060/3063, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31367, at **38 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 2000).
Notably, the dissent responded by quotingthe verypassage from Justice Thomas cited above.
See Simmons-Harris, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31367, at **83 (Ryan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
124. In Everson v. Board of Educ., "New Jersey [spent] tax-raised funds to pay the bus
fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a general program under which it pays the fares
of pupils attending public and other schools." 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947). Justice Rutledge in his
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D. The Debate Over Incentive: A Summary
The debate over incentive-over whether a particular aid package
creates an inducement to choose private over public schools-thus
comes down to this: On the one hand are aid opponents, who take
the immediately preexisting status quo as the baseline. For them,
"[jludgements about the state of the world must be brought to
bear." 5 At least the "state of the world" is a real and definable
baseline, they urge, whereas a "background norm-such as the
"principle of neutrality' 6--- by itself is insufficient to define the
baseline" because it gives "free rein to our political preferences and
our prejudices"; it can be located in any one of a number of places
depending on the beliefs of the person advancing it." And since any
aid package, whether exclusively directed to private school students
or more broadly to both public and private pupils, creates some new
reason-by comparison with that immediately preexisting
baseline-for parents to go private, it falls afoul of the incentive
test. The parents aren't deciding for themselves, but rather are
influenced by the aid itself to skew in a private direction. The
money remains public, not private.
On the other hand are aid defenders, who urge a more normative
baseline, one that theoretically abstracts from or is historically
antecedent to the existential state of the world, whatever that
happens to be. Recall Justice Thomas's Rosenberger concurrence:
"The constitutional demands of the Establishment Clause may be
judged against either a baseline of 'neutrality' or a baseline of 'no
aid to religion,' but the appropriate baseline surely cannot depend
on the fortuitous circumstances"--the existential state of the
world--surrounding the form of aid."" s On the kind of theoretical
dissent concluded that the program "does in fact give aid and encouragement to religious
instruction."Id at45 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Rejecting the majority's conclusion that"this
aid is not 'support' [for religion] in law"-i.e., as a normative proposition-Rutledge
concluded that it was "support in fact." Id For compared to what existed yesterday, he
argued the program "helps the children to get to [parochial] school and the parents to send
them." Id.
125. Laycock, supra note 7, at 1006.
126. E.g., Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2541.
127. Laycock, supra note 7, at 1006.
128. Rosenbergerv. Rectors &Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,862 (1995) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
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or historical baseline that Justice Thomas prefers-one that
prescinds from or exists prior to state support for public
schools-any assistance for private schools is simply counter-
balancing. Far from establishing an incentive to go private, the aid
creates at best a wash, throwing all decisions back to unfettered
parental discretion. The money becomes private, no longer public.
On an existential approach, then, any new aid creates a
"financial incentive" for parents to go private, and hence is
controlled by "state decisionmaking."' It remains public money,
and public money risks constitutional violation ifit serves private,
parochial purposes. Through a normative lens, however, the aid in
no way influences private decision making; any skewing incentive
dissolves and the money remains wholly subject to "private choice."
And private money, of course, can constitutionally serve private,
parochial purposes.
The remaining question, however, is whether those purposes
really are private or are instead public. Here, as we shall see, it is
opponents of aid, in claiming that its purposes are ultimately
private, who adopt a resolutely normative baseline in assessing the
issues. Proponents of aid, in arguing that its purposes are really
public, use a relentlessly existential baseline, just the opposite of
the positions they occupy in the debate over whether the money
itself is public or private.
III. PURPOSES: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE?
As I explained in Part I, the question as to whether aid serves a
public or a private purpose resolves itself into a prior question: Does
the aid program at issue defray expenses that parochial schools
would otherwise have had to meet, thus (money being fungible)
freeing up funds to be spent on the private purposes of religion? Or
does the aid assist expenditures that schools would not otherwise
have been responsible for meeting, meaning that it frees up no
funds for private purposes? If the latter is the case, then the aid
furthers purposes that fall entirely outside the private school's
rubric and are thus purely public, confined to the stipulated "public
129. See Zobrest v. Catalina Hills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993).
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welfare" purposes, and hence not violative of the Establishment
Clause.
Here, the poles reverse themselves. Advocates of aid take the
existing situation, the "state of the world," as the baseline. They
argue, in any given case, that the proposed aid supports a service
that private schools themselves had not, at that particular moment,
in fact been providing. Hence, aid advocates say, the aid saves the
schools no money. Aid opponents, by contrast, eschew whatever
"fortuitous circumstances" happen to surround the aid as a thin
reed on which to base definitions of school responsibility, and
advance their own normative view. They make the case that
regardless of what the immediately preexisting situation might
have been, the aid supports a service that-on some set of
theoretical grounds-would be considered part of a parochial
school's mission, or that historically might have fallen under the
parochial school's responsibility. Thus, to publicly subsidize that
service is indeed to assist the school. It is to free up funds that the
school otherwise would have been obligated to spend were it
operating not as it is, but as it would under a certain theoretical or
historical norm.
A Aid Proponents: An Existential Approach
Consider the rhetoric of aid proponents first. In the Zobrest
case, the Ninth Circuit struck down public provision of an
interpreter for James Zobrest, a deaf student attending Salpointe
parochial school (a decision the Supreme Court later reversed). 3 '
The dissent, in arguing for the constitutionality of the state's aid to
Zobrest, explained its opinion thusly: "The provision of an
interpreter . . . would not relieve Salpointe of any preexisting
financial or educational obligation. Nothing in the record or
argument suggests that, without state aid, Salpointe itself will
undertake the burden of employing an interpreter for James. " "'
The keyword "preexisting" literally reveals an existential criterion,
a concern on the part of aid proponents with the immediate state of
130. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d, 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 1992),
reu'd, 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
131. Id. at 1200 (emphasis added).
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the world, and the existential reality that the school had not, in
fact, been providing the service in question. Hence, the court held
that the aid freed up no school funds that otherwise would have
been spent on an interpreter but which could be used for religious
purposes.
Similarly, in Americans United for Separation of Church and
State v. School District, the dissent would have upheld Grand
Rapids' Shared Time program, under which the state provided
secular courses for students at religious schools, on the following
rationale:
The majority.., predicates a finding of advancement of religion
upon a premise that the challenged programs conferred a
financial benefit upon the non-public schools by relieving their
fiscal responsibilities .... The non-public schools, however,
were never charged with a responsibility for offering the
challenged courses. As the majority concedes... [alll Shared
Time programs... are supplemental to the statutorily required
core curriculum which must be offered by the non-public schools
as a condition of state accreditation. Similarly, all Community
Education courses are supplemental. It follows logically that
the non-public schools have not been relieved of a fiscal
responsibility since they were never . . offer[ing] the
supplemental courses at issue.'32
Again, the question for the court in upholding the aid was an
existential one: Were these courses, as a matter of fact, already
being provided by the school? The answer being no, their provision
by the state could not have freed up any school funds to be spent on
religious purposes; the aid could not have been used fungibly for
sectarian ends. 13
3
132. 718 F.2d 1389, 1410-11 (6th Cir. 1983) (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
133. Indeed, the Americans United majority, in opposing the aid package, conceded that
as an existential matter the programs being funded were not school responsibilities; ergo it
must have deemed them to be school responsibilities on normative grounds. See id. at 1392-
93. The court stated:
Tihe educational opportunities offered through the program are, in the main,
supplementary to the core curriculum of the nonpublic schools .... The specific
courses available through the elementary level Shared Time programs would
not otherwise be available in any of the nonpublic schools ....
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In Everson and Allen, where the aid consisted of busing and
textbooks, defenders likewise observed that neither form of
assistance relieved the school of an immediately preexisting
obligation, meaning that no private funds that might otherwise
have been spent were freed up. As the Court inDiCenso v. Robinson
noted, "in both Everson and Allen, . . . the aid was sustained
[because] the cost of bus fares in Everson and textbooks in Allen
was originally borne by the parents rather than the schools ...
prior to enactment parents bore the costs."" 4 The phrase "prior to"
is key; it is an existential term, directing our attention to what, in
fact, schools had (or more to the point, had not) been doing."3 5
But even in Ball, where the Court invalidated a "shared time"
program that placed public school teachers in religious schools to
teach certain secular classes,"3 6 and Meek, where the Court struck
down parts of two Pennsylvania laws that allowed for state
provision of counselling/therapeutic services and instructional
equipment directly to parochial schools, 3 ' aid defenders were able
to take an existential approach. They argued that as a matter of
fact-regardless of what one might think ought to have been the
case-the schools were not providing such services, hence their
provision by the state would free up no private funds. So, for
example, defenders of the Shared Time program in Ball "argue[d]
that [the] 'subsidy' effect is not significant . . . because the ...
Ofthe nonpublic schools presentlyparticipatingin the CommunityEducation
program, none have ever provided an identical course to their students. In that
respect, Community Education courses do not represent substitutes for courses
formerly offered at nonpublic schools.
134. 316 F. Supp. 112, 118 (D.R.I. 1970). In Allen, "in which the challenged government
practice was lending textbooks . . . there was no evidence that [private schools] had
previously supplied books ... and some evidence that they had not." Mitchell v. Helms, 120
S. Ct. 2530,2576 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
135. Likewise, in the textbook case of Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. ofEduc., the Court
noted:
True, these children attend some school, public or private, the latter, sectarian
or nonsectarian, and... books are to be furnished them for their use, free of
cost, whichever they attend. The schools, however, are not the beneficiaries of
these appropriations. They obtain nothing from them, nor are they relieved of
a single obligation, because of them.
281 U.S. 370, 375 (1930).
136. School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985).
137. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367-73 (1975).
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program [ ] supplemented the curriculum with courses notpreviously
offered."138
Likewise in Meek, aid proponents urged: "[E] ach of these services
is rendered not as a part of the nonpublic school's general
instructional program, but on an individualized basis to specific
children determined to be in need of educational services beyond
that available in a general instructional program."139 They are not
"part of the ordinary regular school curriculum";14 they represent
"an opening up of certain opportunities [that parochial-school
students] really have not had before."' In both cases, in other
words, aid defenders pointed out that even if you believe-on
normative grounds-that the courses or services or equipment in
question should be the school's responsibility to provide (as the Ball
and Meek Courts ultimately did), they were as a matter of fact not
ones the school had been furnishing. Hence their provision by the
state freed up no existing school funds that could then be devoted
to private sectarian purposes.
Likewise in the battery of cases having to do with Title I aid to
parochial schools, which addresses the needs of educationally
deprived children oflow-income families,' 2 aid proponents, whether
they won or lost, argued on existential criteria. In Agostini, the
Court concluded:
In all relevant respects, the provision of instructional services
under Title I is indistinguishable from the provision of sign
language interpreters [in Zobrest]. Title I services are by law
supplemental to the regular curricula. These services do not,
therefore, "relieve sectarian schools of costs they otherwise
would have borne in educating their students."43
Here, the court was reversing its position in Aguilar, instead
agreeing with Justice O'Connor's dissent in that case:
138. Ball, 473 U.S. at 396 (emphasis added).
139. Meek v. Pittenger, 374 F. Supp. 639, 654 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
140. Id. at 655.
141. Id at 656.
142. See Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-8962 (1994)).
143. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 228 (1997) (quoting Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 12 (1993)).
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The only type ofimpermissible effect that arguably could [arise
in] this litigation... is the effect of subsidizing "the religious
functions of the parochial schools by taking over a substantial
portion of their responsibility for teaching secular subjects."
That effect is tenuous, however, in light of the statutory
directive that Title I funds may be used only to provide services
that otherwise would not be available to the participating
students. The Secretary of Education has vigorously enforced
the requirement that Title I funds supplement rather than
supplant the services of local education agencies.'
And so, too, with the Title H aid that defenders successfully upheld
in Mitchell, which provided monetary grants for the acquisition of
computers and other instructional equipment: it "may only
supplement and, to the extent practical, increase the level of funds
that would be made available" to schools; it may not "supplant
[parochial-school] funds."'45
A complementary way for aid proponents to make their point
that the service being supported was not previously being
underwritten by the schools is to show that in fact parents were
formerly paying for it. Consider the textbook cases: "[S]ince the
textbooks inAllen had been previously provided by the parents, and
not the schools, no aid to the institution was involved."" As with
Allen, so with Meek, in which the Court, while striking down a
Pennsylvania law that provided parochial schools with state-
supported counselling and therapeutic services and instructional
equipment, upheld that portion dealing with textbooks: "The
Supreme Court in Meek did note that, prior to the commencement
of the . . . textbook programs . . . the parents of nonpublic
144. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 425 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); see also Felton v. United States Dep't of Educ., 739
F.2d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Federal financing is available only for programs that will
supplement, rather than supplant, non-federally funded programs that would have been
available in the absence of Title I funds."); Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127,145
(Me. 1999) ("[Tjhe Agostini Court found it significant that the services provided at the
religious school supplemented rather than supplanted the costs thatwould otherwise be born
by that schooL").
145. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2537 (2000).
146. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 656 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
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schoolchildren purchased their own textbooks."'47 Again, the
situation existent "prior to" the initiation of the program is
controlling, and if parochial schools are not in fact the ones
providing the service at that stage, then a state program that now
offers it frees up no private-school funds to be used for religious
purposes.' As with both Allen and Meek, so also with the busing
case Visser v. Nooksack Valley School District:
[Tihe transportation of pupils to and from the Christian school
is of no benefit to the school itself. [Instead,] the transportation
of pupils to and from the school inures... to the benefit of the
pupils and their parents, in that it simply relieves them from
the obligation incident to compulsory attendance statutes of
providing transportation themselves.'49
If busing aid relieves parents of an obligation, it necessarily does
not relieve the school; hence it cannot fungibly be used to abet the
school's private purposes.
In sum, when it comes to whether the aid in question serves
public or private purposes, the issue for its defenders is an
existential one. What matters is that the services that the aid in
question would support are not already being provided by the
schools, regardless of whether by some normative baseline they
might have been. This, of course, is precisely the approach that aid
opponents take when it comes to determining whether the money
itself is better understood as public or private. There, what matters
is that assistance for the services at issue is already being provided
to public schools by the government, regardless of whether by some
normative baseline it might not have been. As long as the
assistance is already being furnished by the government to public
schools, it is included in the baseline from which any aid to private
schools represents anincentive-creating departure-instead of itself
representing a departure from some normatively conceived baseline
that the challenged private-school aid only countervails.
147. Wolman v. Essex, 417 F. Supp. 1113, 1118 n.2 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (citations omitted),
vacated, 421 U.S. 982 (1975).
148. See Meek v. Pittenger, 374 F. Supp. 639, 675 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (Higginbotham, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
149. 207 P.2d 198, 202 (Wash. 1949).
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B. Aid Opponents: A Normative Approach
Given that aid proponents argue as an existential matter of fact
that the contested programs would provide services that parochial
schools are not otherwise offering, those who would oppose them
must necessarily argue as a matter of norm. Specifically, they must
and do argue that when considered against some theoretical or
historical standard, these are indeed services that fall within a
school's baseline responsibility. Thus, to aid those services is to aid
the school, because any such support fungibly frees up funds the
schoolwould otherwise have had a normatively construed obligation
to spend on whatever services the aid happens to support, whether
it was actually fulfilling that responsibility at the moment. On this
interpretation, the purposes the aid furthers can very easily become
private, instead of assuredly remaining public.
This argument, of course, is reminiscent of the approach aid
proponents take in showing that the aid money is private, no longer
public. In that debate, proponents disregard the existential
baseline, which includes aid that the government is already
providing to public schools, insisting that, when considered against
some theoretical or historical criterion, the aid government gives to
public schools falls outside the baseline such that any comparable
aid to private schools simply creates an incentiveless wash.
So, for example, in Everson,, which upheld aid for school
buses-something that schools themselves had not previously been
providing-Justice Rutledge, in dissent, took a normative approach,
arguing that:
[Transportation, where it is needed, is as essential to education
as any other element .... No less essential is it, or the payment
of its cost, than the very teaching in the classroom or payment
of the teacher's sustenance ... . For me . . . [p]ayment of
transportation is no more, nor is it any the less essential to
education, whether religious or secular, than payment for
tuitions, for teachers' salaries, for buildings, equipment and
necessary materials .... No rational line can be drawn between
148520011
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payment for such larger, but not more necessary, items and
payment for transportation.1 0
Justice Rutledge's repeated use of the word "essential" is key here.
It echoes a venerable terminological opposition in modern
philosophy between the "essential" and the "existential," the one
that defines the nature of a thing by its essence-by a normative
notion of what it should do-and the other by its existential
qualities-by the happenstance of what it actually is or does do.15'
And Rutledge's deployment of the qualifier "for me" also signifies a
subjective, normative as opposed to an objective, existential
perspective, one growing out of his own beliefs instead of emanating
from an observation of the state of the world.
52
Both the concept of the "essential" and the first-person assertion
of commitment also appear in this passage from Judd v. Board of
Education, a textbook-aid case:
School books [which as an existential matter parents, not
parochial schools, were providing] are as essential to the means
ofimparting instruction to the children as are other educational
150. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1947).
151. See, e.g., GORDON HARLAND, THE THOUGHT OF REINHOLD NiEBUHR (1960)
(distinguishing between Niebuhr's conception of "essential" and "existential man"); Patrick
L. Bourgeois, The Integration of Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy, 5 Sw. PHIL. REV. 37 (1989)
(contrasting "essential phenomenological themes with "existential phenomenology"); Joseph
A. Bracken,Essential and Existential Truth, 28 PHIL. TODAY 66 (1984) (contrasting "essential
truth" and "existential truth"); Charles E. Caton, Essentially Arising Questions and the
Ontology ofaNaturalLanguage, 5 NOs 27 (1971) (distinguishing between the essential and
the existential in the philosophy of language); Albert William Levi, The Two Imaginations,
25 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL REs. 188 (1964) (distinguishing the "existential" from the
"essential" imagination); Armand Maurer, Descartes and Aquinas on the Unity of a Human
Being: Revisited, 67 AM. CATH. PHIL. Q. 497 (1993) (arguing that in Descartes and Aquinas,
the existential factor, as distinct from the essential, plays the key role); John M. McDermott,
Maritain on Two Infinities: God and Matter, 28 INT'L PHIL. Q. 257 (1988) (contrasting
"existential and essential orders"); James B. Steeves, Authenticity and Falling in Martin
Ieideggers 'Being and Time,"46 IYYUN 237 (1997) (contrasting"essential" and"existential"
notions in Heidegger's philosophy); Norman J. Wells, Suarez, Historian and Critic of the
Modal Distinction Between Essential Being and Existential Being, 36 NEW SCHOLAST. 419
(1962) (distinguishing between existential and essential in the thought of Suarez).
152. See also Judd v. Board of Educ., where the court declared flatly, advancing a
contestable norm for which it made no argument: "It is illogical to say that the furnishing of
transportation is not an aid to the institution while the employment of teachers and
furnishing of books, accommodations and other facilities are such an aid." 15 N.E.2d 576,
582 (N.Y. 1938).
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appliances, schoolhouses and schoolteachers .... I do not believe
that any one will contend for a moment that, in the face of the
prohibitory clauses of the Constitution, money can be taken
from the public treasury for the purpose of furnishing the
children in private and sectarian schools with these necessary
educational facilities. 153
In these and other cases, aid opponents argue that "where the state
has supplied [parochial] school children with transportation and
books, sectarian educational enterprises are indirectly aided by
being relieved of a financial burden which they might otherwise feel
obligated to bear."' s ' Not burdens that they actually happen to bear,
but that they "might otherwise feel obligated to bear": a
normatively, not existentially rooted criterion.
What of cases like Ball and Meek, involving programs of state
support for instructional materials and teachers of secular subjects
at parochial schools? 55 Recall that aid defenders "argue that [these
programs] supplement[I the curriculum with courses not previously
offered in the religious schools." 55 But aid opponents remain
unmoved bywhat might "previously" have been the existential case:
153. Id. at 583.
154. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35, 50 (E.D. Pa. 1969). In Wolman v. Walter,
Justice Marshall stated
It is, of course, unquestionable that textbooks are central to the educational
process. Under the rationale ofMeek, therefore, they should not be provided by
the State to sectarian schools because "[s]ubstantial aid to the educational
function of such schools ... necessarily results in aid to the sectarian school
enterprise as a whole."
433 U.S. 229,258 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Meekv. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975)) (alteration in original), overruled by Mitchell v.
Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000). The phrase "it is... unquestionable that textbooks are central
to the educational process" is premised on a normative, not an existential, perspective, for
indeed, as an existential matter, the schools were not paying for textbooks prior to the case.
Hence, as a matter of fact, if not norm, they were not "part of the educational function of
[parochial] schools." See also Board of Educ. v. Allen, 228 N.E.2d 791, 796 (N.Y. 1976)
(stating that '[ilt seems to us to be giving a strained and unusual meaning to words if we
hold that the books and the ordinary school supplies, when furnished for the use of pupils,
is a furnishing to the pupils and not a furnishing in aid or maintenance of a school--even
though schools, as a matter of existential fact, had not been paying for them).
155. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
156. School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 396 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997).
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[We do not find that this feature of the program is controlling.
... The distinction between courses that "supplement" and
those that "supplant" the regular curriculum is therefore not
nearly as clear as petitioners allege. [And] although the precise
courses offered in these programs may have been new to the
participating religious schools, their general subject
matter-reading, mathematics, etc.-was surely a part of the
curriculum in the past, and the concerns of the Establishment
Clause may thus be triggered despite the "supplemental"
nature of the courses.
57
Here, we see both a theoretically based claim---"the distinction
between courses that 'supplement' and those that 'supplant'... is
not clear"--and an historical one--"surely these supplementary
programs were a part of the curriculum in the past"-up against
the admitted fact that, by comparison with the immediately
preceding existent state, the courses supported here were in fact
anew."
What aid opponents lookto, then, in determining whether schools
are responsible for providing the challenged services, and hence
whether state aid risks fungibly abetting private ends, is not
whether schools actually provide those services but whether, on
some theoretical or historical baseline, they would. This is just the
opposite of the approach aid opponents take in determining
whether aid money is private or public. What matters for them is
what government actually provides, not what it would provide on
some theoretical or historical baseline.
Perhaps Justice Souter's dissent in Agostini illustrates the
normative approach, and contrasts it with its existential
competitor, most clearly. InAgostini, the state provided "remedial"
instructional services through Title I which were-as Justice Souter
conceded-existentially "supplemental" to the courses private
schools were already providing. 5 ' Indeed, Title I expressly requires
that anything supported through its provisions not supplant
activities that the school is already undertaking, because it would
then simply be substituting public for private money, freeing up the
157. Id.
158. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 244 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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latter. 5 9 But nevertheless, on a particular normative view-one on
which the supplemental remedial teaching services fall within the
school's normative "obligation," whether or not the school is actually
providing them-Title I does relieve "the responsibility of the
schools themselves," freeing up funds they should otherwise be
spending on remedial services. 60 Justice Souter argued:
What was so remarkable was that the schemes in issue
assumed a teaching responsibility indistinguishable from the
responsibility of the schools themselves. The obligation of
primary and secondary schools to teach reading necessarily
extends to teaching those who are having a hard time at it, and
the same is true of math. Calling some classes remedial does
not distinguish their subjects from the schools' basic subjects,
however inadequately the schools may have been addressing
them.... While it would be an obvious sham, say, to channel
cash to religious schools to be credited only against the expense
of "secular" instruction, the line between "supplemental" and
general education is likewise impossible to draw.
161
Hence, Justice Souter concluded: "Instead of providing a service the
school would not otherwise furnish, the Title I services necessarily
relieve[] a religious school of 'an expense that it otherwise would
have assumed." 16' But since the school was not in fact assuming
responsibility for those services, Souter's argument that by
underwriting them the state would have been disburdening private
schools must assume that, as a normative matter, it is the schools'
"obligation" to supply such services.
What of the only case where the teaching services that the state
sought to support were in fact, and not just on a particular norm,
part of the parochial school's mandate? What, in other words, of the
only case where, as an existential matter, the school was actually
already providing the service in question? That case was Lemon
itself, where the state sought to assist parochial schools to pay the
159. See Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 77 (1965)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-8962 (1994)); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 241.
160. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 245.
161. Id at 245-46.
162. Id at 252 (citation omitted) (quoting Zobrestv. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S.
1, 12(1993)).
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salaries of instructors teaching core secular subjects. 163 But even
there, although aid opponents could have appropriated the
existential argument--claiming that as a matter of fact the service
was indeed previously being funded by the school, so that the aid in
fact freed up funds for possible sectarian purposes-they chose
instead to argue on normative grounds. That is, they opted to claim
that the services being assisted were, as a normative matter, part
and parcel of a school's responsibility. Or, to use the old distinction,
they argued on essentialist not existentialist criteria, looking at the
essence of what a school should be doing rather than the existent
fact of what it actually does. "Quality teaching in secular subjects
is an integral part of this religious enterprise," Justice Brennan
-declared in his Lemon opinion, and "[g]ood secular teaching is as
essential to the religious mission of the parochial schools as a roof
for the school or desks for the classrooms."164
In a related vein, aid opponents sometimes reframe their
normative argument in the following way. If the existential
criterion urged by aid proponents is adopted, they say, then over
time parochial schools could deliberately shed services-even basic
teaching services-safe in the knowledge that were the state to
then take them over, the public treasury would not be underwriting
services that parochial schools were (at that moment) otherwise
offering. After all, on existential criteria, as long as parochial
schools were not immediately previously providing a service-even
basic math instruction-the state could underwrite it without
relieving the school of a burden and freeing up funds. But surely, on
any reasonable norm, whether theoretical or historical, we think of
such a service as being integral to the responsibilities of a private
school, indeed any school. Therefore, the preexisting status quo,
whatever it promiscuously happens to be at any given time, could
not possibly be the appropriate baseline of school responsibility,
because it really is no standard at all.
Justice Souter's argument hints at this concern, but others have
been more explicit. "[Pletitioner's argument," the Ball court
complained,
163. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1971).
164. Id. at 657 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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would permit the public schools gradually to take over the
entire secular curriculum of the religious school, for the latter
could surely discontinue existing courses so that they might be
replaced a year or two later by a Community Education or
Shared Time course with the same content. The average
religious school student, for instance, now spends 10% of the
schoolday in Shared Time classes. But there is no principled
basis [i.e., if we go by existential criteria, then there are no
norms or principles available] on which this Court can impose
a limit on the percentage of the religious schoolday that can be
subsidized by the public school. To let the genie out of the bottle
in this case would be to permit ever larger segments of the
religious school curriculum to be turned over to the public
school system, thus violating the cardinal principle that the
State may not in effect become the prime supporter of the
religious school system.'65
Likewise, the Felton court declared that, on the existential criteria
recommended by aid proponents,
[clonsiderable segments of the curriculum of the religious
schools could be turned over to public school teachers .... It
will not do to say that such an outcome cannot occur "while this
Court sits," unless there is a principled basis [i.e., a norm] on
which the Court can impose a limit. The Court has thus wisely
decided, as we read its cases, that whatever the situation may
be with respect to other forms of government aid, no part of the
teaching or counseling function in parochial schools can be
performed by public school employees, whether under a good
plan, a bad plan, or no plan at all."
Assume, in other words, that religious schools were to withdraw
from all their secular teaching responsibilities so that, as an
existential proposition, state aid for their entire teaching function
165. School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 396-97 (1985) (emphasis added), overruled by
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
166. Felton v. United States Dep't of Educ., 739 F.2d 48, 67 (2d Cir. 1984); see also
Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. School Dist., 718 F.2d 1389, 1405-06
(6th Cir. 1983) ("The Public School District is gradually, but surely, taking over an integral
function of these religious schools; namely, providing an education to parochial students..
.. The only costs not covered may in time be those specifically allocated to religious services
or classes in religious instruction.").
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would not relieve a burden they were currently assuming and free
up funds. Even so, on the basis of the "societal norms" and
"historical precedent" that should be "significant in determining a
baseline from which to measure whether religion has been
advanced"-that is, on the basis that parochial schools should be in
principle or were in the more distant past providing the service in
question-the state would clearly be defraying a school
obligation. 1
67
C. A Final Battle Over Fungibility
There is a particular kind of case in which combat between aid
proponents and aid opponents gains heightened intensity: where
the aid helps private schools comply with a new mandate or
regulation that the state has at the same time promulgated.
Consider, for example, a new state law that requires parochial
schools to administer exams while providing the funds to assist
them in doing so. For aid proponents, the fact that, existentially
speaking, the mandated or regulatory responsibilties are new ones,
ones that schools did not previously have to observe, means that the
accompanying aid does not defray a purpose the school would
otherwise have had to fufill out of its own coffers. But for
167. Stick, supra note 60, at 471.
The crux of the case for me is whether you can by sophisticated accounting
methods fund only secular programs in nonpublic schools, recognizing that a
substantial monetary benefit is realized by the sectarian organization, without
primarily aiding or advancing religion. For me the answer is unequivocally,
emphatically and resoundingly NO.... [A] law which converts a school's entire
task of providing secular instruction from a purely private to a predominately
state responsibility, while permitting religious instruction to continue
unaltered, would constitute sponsorship of the school-the physical and
administrative facility throughwhich religion is taught--even if all public funds
were formally designated to be spent for functions other than teaching religion.
Meek v. Pittenger, 374 F. Supp. 639, 675-76 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (Higginbotham, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
For their part, aid defenders argue that this kind of normatively based concern, which
rejects existential fact in favor of personal norms ("for me.. ."), is counterfactual. As a
matter of fact, private schools simply will never withdraw from the provision of secular
teaching services, expecting the state to then pick up the tab. See, e.g., Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 785 (1973). Justice Powell declared that
Justice Black's "fears regarding [state support for] religious buildings and religious teachers
have not come to pass and insofar as [the state's] 'pick[ing] up... the bills for the religious
schools' [is concerned,] neither has [this] fear materialized." Id.
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opponents, the fact that the responsibility is now required of schools
by mandated or regulatory norms-the fact that, normatively
speaking, it is a school responsibility to administer exams-means
that the aid does defray a purpose that the school would otherwise
have had to fulfill out of its own coffers.
So on the one hand, aid defenders produce rhetoric such as the
following from Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty
v. Levitt, which dealt, in part, with state assistance for attendance-
taking at state-required exams. 168
Of course it might be argued that since sectarian schools would
otherwise be required to expend funds for the taking and
recording of attendance, they benefit to the extent that
reimbursement facilitates an activity that is essential to the
conduct of the sectarian enterprise as a whole or at least "frees
up" funds for religious purposes. [But allthough record-keeping
may be part of the operation of a sectarian school... [in our
view it is closer to the operation of buses for the transportation
of children to sectarian schools, the cost of which may
[therefore] be reimbursed by the State without violation of the
Establishment Clause.169
As for aid opponents, they place their emphasis on the fact that
the law now normatively requires the private school to perform the
service regardless of whether, existentially, it had not been
supplying it immediately previously. Since, as a normative
proposition, the school is responsible for the service, for the state to
help underwrite it is in effect to free up funds that the school would
otherwise have had to spend administering the test, allowing those
monies to be channeled instead towards religious purposes. In his
dissent in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Regan, another exam-aid case, Justice Blackmun opined:
The aid provided by Chapter 507 goes primarily to reimburse
such schools for personnel costs incurred in complying with
state repdrting and testing requirements, costs that must be
incurred if the school is to be accredited to provide a combined
sectarian-secular educationto school-age pupils. To continue to
168. 461 F. Supp. 1123, 1125 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
169. Id. at 1130.
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function as religious schools, sectarian schools thus are required
to incur the costs outlined.., or else lose accreditation by the
State of New York. These reporting and testing requirements
would be met by the schools whether reimbursement were
available or not. As such, the attendance, informational, and
testing expenses compensated by Chapter 507 are essential to
the overall educational functioning of sectarian schools in New
York in the same way instruction in secular subjects is
essential.170
"Therefore," the Regan Court concluded, "just as direct aid for
ostensibly secular purposes by provision of instructional materials
... is forbidden by the Establishment Clause, so [is] direct aid for
the performance ofrecordkeeping and testing activities."17' Such aid
defrays costs that, as a normative matter, form part of the parochial
school's responsibilities, thus freeing up funds the school would
otherwise have had to spend, enabling them to be devoted to
sectarian purposes.
D. The Debate Over Fungibility: A Summary
In sum, the debate over whether the money-public or private
depending on the questions discussed in Part II-itself goes to
public or private purposes comes down to this: in almost all school
aid cases, the service in question is, as a matter of existential fact,
not one that the private school had been supplying previously. Aid
defenders seize on this fact, arguing that it means the aid in no way
relieves the school of a burden it would otherwise have borne, and
thus frees up none of its resources for private religious purposes.
170. 444 U.S. 646, 668 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
In the present case, it is conceded that the attendance taking and test
administration are performed during regular school hours by school personnel
and would be so performed whether or not reimbursement is available.... In
order to continue to qualify as institutions providing an educational alternative
to public schools, the private school beneficiaries must continue to comply with
the state's reporting and testing requirements. Compliance with state laws
regulating education is as much a part of the educational fimction of private
schools as classroom instruction in secular subjects.
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Levitt, 414 F. Supp. 1174, 1179 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), vacated, 433 U.S. 902 (1977).
171. Regan, 444 U.S. at 668 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Hence, they conclude, the purposes which the aid underwrites
remain purely public. For their part, aid opponents conclude that
regardless of the existential fact of the matter, on some plausible (if
usually unarticulated) norm, such s-ervices are school
responsibilities. And so the aid does relieve the school of a
responsibility that it would otherwise properly bear, thus freeing up
some of its funds for private purposes.
IV. A LOOSE END
Reconstructed to display its most central characteristics, the
constitutional argument over state aid to parochial schools comes
down to this: On the one side are opponents of aid who see the
program in question as a means of flowing public money toward
private purposes. Taking an existential view of baseline government
responsibility, they claim that the aid creates a publicly structured
incentive to choose private school-hence it remains public
money-while, according to their normative view of baseline school
responsibility, it underwrites services that really are better
understood as baseline school obligations, thus fungibly freeing up
funds for private purposes. On the other side, of course, are
proponents of aid who conceive the money as private and/or its
purposes as public. Taking a normative view of government
responsibility, they argue that no publicly structured incentives
interfere with private discretion over how the money is
spent-hence the money remains private-while at the same time,
taking an existential view of school responsibility, they urge that
the aid underwrites no responsibilities that parochial schools are
actually assuming, thereby freeing up no funds for private ends and
serving only public purposes.
In Part V, I will draw on previous discussion to show what I have
already at points suggested: that the (existential) arguments aid
opponents advance in urging that the money is public are, at a
fundamental level, inconsistent with the (normative) arguments
they mount in claiming that the purposes it serves are private.
Likewise, I will show that the (normative) assumptions made by aid
proponents in deeming the money private contradict the
(existential) approach they adopt in claiming its purposes to be
public.
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Here, though, I will tie up a loose end. Notice that while those
opposed to aid must depict it as public money flowing to private
purposes, defenders of aid need only insist that the money is private
or that its purposes are public. In other words, their approach can
be disjunctive, which explains a couple of remaining rhetorical
strands.
On the one hand, while aid defenders sometimes concede that the
money might well be understood as public-since it flows through
an incentive structure created by the government-they
nevertheless claim that the purposes to which it flows are also
public, in that no school funds are ultimately being freed for private
purposes. Hence there is ultimately no constitutional violation;
after all, public funds can flow to public purposes. So, for example,
one commentator argues that a statute should be upheld even if it
"attract[s] a .significant number of additional students to . . .
parochial schools"-that is, even if it provides a state-structured
incentive for them to attend parochial schools-as long as it does
not fungibly "furnish the schools with additional funding for
religious purposes" by "taking over a substantial portion of their
responsibility for teaching secular subjects."172
On the other hand, defenders of a particular aid program
sometimes concede that it may well actually help advance the
private purposes of the school, but claim that because the money is
better understood as private as well-here they point to the absence
of any incentives directing its disposition-no constitutional
violation takes place. If "there [is] no incentive to use the aid at a
religious institution," if "the student . . . 'transmits it to the
educational institution of his or her choice"---meaning that the
money is essentially private-then such aid may be "upheld...
even though the religious institution could use the assistance
provided through the student for any purpose," including a private
172. Stick, supra note 60, at 470 n.323; see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,467
(1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that "even though [the] expenditure may cause
some children to go to parochial schools who would not otherwise have gone," as long as it
serves a public purpose, the aid passes constitutional muster); Eversonv. Board ofEduc., 330
U.S. 1, 17 (1947) (arguing that "[tihere is even a possibility that some of the children might
not be sent to the church schools if the parents were compelled to pay their children's bus
fares out of their own pockets-meaning the aid creates an incentive for them to go there
and hence the money remains public-but if nevertheless such state-provided busing to
parochial schools serves a "public purpose," it must be upheld).
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parochial one.17 Justice Thomas, in Mitchell, likewise made such
a claim, arguing that as long as the aid money can be deemed
genuinely private-because it comes with no "impermissible
incentive" to choose private school-then it does not matter whether
the purposes it serves are also private, for "any use of that aid to
indoctrinate cannot be attributed to the government and is thus not
of constitutional concern." 174
173. Campbellv. ManchesterBd. ofSch. Dirs., 641 A.2d352,358 (Vt. 1994); see also Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1989) (arguing that aid does not have the effect
of advancing religion even if it fungibly relieves religious groups of costs they would
otherwise incur, as long as it comes in the form of a general program of assistance that does
not favor religious institutions over others, thus providing no incentive for their utilization);
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741, 743 (1973) (stating that "the Court has not accepted the
recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees
it to spend its other resources on religious ends"; aid can flow to private ends as long as the
particular program's "benefits... are available to all institutions of higher education...
whether or not [they have] a religious affiliation--in other words, as long as the aid money
remains private, bereft of a state-imposed incentive for it to be spent one way or the other).
174. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2547 (2000). A related point bears mention. To
understand its import, imagine first an aid program that opponents describe as creating an
"existential incentive to patronize parochial school. That is, compared with the immediately
preceding status quo, even if not against some normative or theoretical baseline of state
neutrality, the aid provides some new financial reason to go private. For example, the state
may provide free busing or textbooks. Assume equally, however, that on existential grounds
the aid flows to a service that does not relieve the parochial school of an obligation, thus
freeing up no funds for private purposes. In other words, suppose that the service was not
one that parochial schools were providing in the immediately preexisting status quo, even
if on some normative or theoretical grounds it is their responsibility to do so.
Now with that in mind, consider the following claim. Even if we accept the existential
criterion-noting that the busing or book services in question are not ones that the school
was underwriting anyway, such that in paying for them the state frees up no new funds that
the school can devote to private purposes-we still face a potential problem. Knowing that
parents are now getting free busing services or textbooks, the school can simply raise its
tuition commensurately so as to capture their gains. As Choper puts it, "[slince tuition
charges are flexible," they "could readily be adjusted upward to take advantage of the
parents' subsidies.., thus providing [the school] with funds available for strictly religious
use." Choper, supra note 56, at 315 n.382, 319. Or, as Senator Bob Packwood told private-
school officials at the 1981 subcommittee hearing on tuition tax credits:
What I want to ask each of you is to lay to rest, if you can, [the concern] that if
we pass this [tuition-tax credit bill], you are all going to immediately raise your
tuition, and this is just going to become a Federal subsidy for the school, and
the parents will be no better off than if we never pass a bill.
Tuition Tax Credits Hearings, supra note 30, at 220.
In raising its tuition in this way, the school would be getting new money, money that is
new on existential grounds-new, that is, compared with the immediately preexisting status
quo. As a result, the aid relieves the school of some expenditures it actually undertakes as
an existential matter-let alone whatever it may be responsible for on normative criteria.
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V. THE CONTRADICTION AT THE CORE OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
DISCOURSE
Time and again, in cases involving state aid for parochial schools,
the disagreement over whether to conceptualize the aid money as
public or private boils down to the question of "incentive." In the
same way, discourse over whether to conceive of the aid's purpose
as public or private resolves itself into the issue of "fungibility."
I looked at the "incentive" debate first. The money in question is
more appropriately thought of as retaining its public character if it
in some way constrains, controls, or skews the ends to which
parents direct it-if, to use the term most often employed by judges
and commentators, the program comes with a state-created
"incentive" for the money to be spent one way or another. State-
originated money is more plausibly deemed private, however, if no
such incentives bias the discretion of the private party to direct the
money as he or she likes. I analyzed the rhetorical moves made by
aid opponents and proponents on this question.
At rock bottom, I suggested, aid opponents take an "existential"
view of the proper baseline from which to gauge the possible
emergence of an incentive. Whatever the immediately preexisting
status quo happens to be-whatever the government had been
doing prior to the advent of the program-if the aid creates any
deviation from it, then a choice-fettering incentive exists, and the
money is more properly thought of as publicly, not privately,
controlled.
Aid proponents, by contrast, take a more "normative" approach
to the "incentive" baseline. They scrape away the existent status
quo to reach some prior historical or preeminent theoretical
Even though the money's initial purposes were public-supportingbusing and books thatthe
private school was not previously underwriting-with a tuition price hike, the aid can be
converted to private purposes by relieving the school of obligations it would have had to
underwrite anyway. But note that to the extent that tuition goes up, any incentive that the
aid provides to parents to send their children to private school would diminish. After all, if
the free busing and books are countervailed by a price hike from the institution, then even
on existential grounds, there is no new incentive to send one's child to parochial school. In
other words, with a tuition price hike, the purposes to which aid is devoted may become
private (even on existential grounds), but then so does the money (even on existential
grounds), for with a tuition hike, the aid creates no new incentives to go private over public
leaving its disposition instead entirely up to parental choice.
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baseline from which to measure incentive-usually a baseline from
which substantial government support for public schools has
already created departures that the private aid now in question at
best counterbalances-thus, in fact, generating no overall incentive
for parents to choose private schools. Once we thus back away from
the here and now, in other words, and adopt a more "traditional and
normative" baseline as the appropriate measure of government's
initial responsibility, we will see that the aid does not create an
incentive to choose private school even if, taken from that precise
existential moment, it might have. 75 On this approach, the money
is private because it is privately controlled.
I then looked at the "fumgibility" debate-the debate over how to
conceive the kind of purposes to which the money (whether public
or private) ultimately flows. Are those purposes themselves public
or private? Here, the question is whether the object of the aid is a
school responsibility such that, in assuming it, the state fungibly
frees up funds that the school can then use for private purposes. Or,
on the contrary, are the services in question not part and parcel of
the school's responsibility such that, in aiding them, the program
serves only its stipulated "public welfare" purpose and frees up no
funds for private ends?
The deep structure of judicial and scholarly debate over this
question of fungibility reveals that it is aid proponents who take an
"existential" approach. Specifically, aid proponents urge that the
appropriate baseline from which to decide whether any new
program relieves a school of responsibility is whatever the school
had been doing immediately prior to the advent of the program.
If the school had not been engaged in that activity, then obviously
funding it would not free up money that the school would, as a
matter of fact, otherwise be spending on it. The aid, consequently,
does not find itself fungibly assisting private ends. Rather, it
remains confined to its stipulated public purposes.
It is aid opponents, by contrast, who take a more normative
approach by insisting that we back away from the existential here
and now and adopt a theoretically or historically fashioned baseline
as the appropriate measure of a school's responsibility, using
"historical precedent and societal norms" to "determin[e] a
175. Choper, supra note 56, at 340.
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baseline."176 Once we do that, aid opponents believe, we will see
that the aid does indeed relieve the school of a burden that it would
otherwise have had to bear, even if it was not shouldering that
burden at that precise instant, and so is assisting the private
purposes of the school.
A. The Contradiction for Aid Opponents
I have thus tried to find a path to the very heart of the
assumptions separating pro-aid and anti-aid forces. What has been
revealed is a kind of mirror-image reversal on each side. Anti-aid
judges and commentators adopt an existential perspective on the
question of how to draw the appropriate baseline-how to
determine the point of departure from which any inducements
should be measured-when the issue is incentive. The state of the
world-whatever government happens to be providing at that
moment-is the appropriate point of departure. But in addressing
the question of how to draw the appropriate baseline when the
issue is fungibility-how to determine the point of departure from
which school responsibility should be measured-whatever "the
state of the world is," or whatever schools happen to provide or not
provide at that moment, is simply too promiscuous and ungrounded
a starting-off point. Instead, aid opponents summon up a
normative-a theoretically or historically grounded-view as to
where to draw the line.
When the question is incentive, then, the key baseline for aid
opponents is whatever the "state of the world" throws up; it is the
one that currently-existentially--circumscribes what government
actually does. Aid opponents feel no need to search for a
normatively grounded line-a line that describes what government
would do on some theoretical or historical norm. But when the
question is fungibility, whatever the "state of the world" throws up
is manifestly not sufficient; the key baseline is not simply the one
that currently--existentially--circumscribes what the parochial
school actually does. Instead, the appropriate baseline must be one
that describes what the parochial school would do on some
theoretically- or historically-crafted norm.
176. Stick, supra note 60, at 471.
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On the one hand, then, according to aid opponents, courts should
reject the kind of normative baseline against which the aid would
simply be seen to perform the same function as assistance the state
already provides to public schools, thus merely countervailing that
assistance and creating an incentiveless wash. Rather, for aid
opponents, the appropriate baseline is the immediate existential
moment, against which the aid represents something "additional"
that benefits private schools alone and hence creates an incentive
that does influence parental decision making. On this
understanding, the money remains publicly skewed and not wholly
within the control of private discretion.
On the other hand, when it comes to determining the purposes
the aid serves, the appropriate baseline for opponents is very much
a normative one-one on which the aid performs the same function
as spending the private school should already have been
undertaking, supplanting that spending and fungibly freeing up
funds the school can devote to private purposes. Here, the
appropriate baseline is emphatically not an existential one. It
differs deeply, in other words, from one that would look at what
schools at the immediate moment were in fact providing and on
which the aid would then represent something "additional" or
supplemental, not a substitute that frees up funds the school would
otherwise be spending. For aid opponents, their normative approach
to this baseline allows them to conclude that the purposes served
have left the realm of the public and become private.
But if the "preexisting" situation (as then-Professor Scalia called
it) 1" suffices as the baseline for determining the presence of
incentive-and hence the question of whether the money is public
or private-then why should not the "preexisting" situation, as the
Zobrest appellate court identically called it,178 suffice for
determining the presence of fungibility-and hence the question of
whether the aid frees up funds the school can devote to private
purposes? Put it another way: If, when the question is incentive, it
is unacceptable to back away from the existential here and now and
adopt what Choper calls a "traditional and normative"179 baseline
177. See supra text accompanying note 109.
178. See supra text accompanying note 131.
179. Choper, supra note 56, at 340.
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of government responsibility, then why is it quite acceptable, when
the question is fungibility, to back away from the existential here
and now, and adopt what Michael Stick calls "historical precedent"
and "societal norms" to "determin[e] a baseline"18 ' of school
responsibility?
B. The Contradiction for Aid Proponents
What of the argumentation mounted by aid proponents? When
the question is incentive-when the question is whether the aid
money is ultimately public or private-they adopt a normative
approach. Aid proponents urge us to hang back from the existential
present-from whatever the state of the world happens to be and
from wherever government is currently drawing its baseline-in
determining whether the aid creates a new inducement to attend
private school. Instead, they invoke a theoretically or historically
grounded view of the baseline from which any ultimate incentive
effect must be measured-one from which subsequent departures
in favor of public schools countervail any incentive effect created by
the aid program in favor of private schools. This normative baseline
renders the money more privately than publicly controlled. But
when the issue is fungibility, aid proponents reject the idea of
hanging back from the existential present-of invoking a
theoretically or historically grounded baseline-to determine
whether any public aid supplants what private schools would
otherwise be providing. Instead, whatever the state of the world
happens to be-wherever schools are currently drawing their
baseline-suffices as the point of departure aid proponents take in
determining the school's responsibility. On this criterion the aid
does not supplant services the school is in fact otherwise
underwriting and thus serves only public, not private purposes.
Yet if the state of the world is good enough for determining
fungibility-for determining whether the aid ultimately restricts
itself to public purposes or flows to private ends-then why is it not
good enough for measuring incentive-for determining whether the
money is public or private? Alternatively, if we should look to what
government would provide-on some theoretical or historical
180. Stick, supra note 60, at 471.
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baseline-when we have to determine the presence of incentive,
then why not look to what parochial schools would provide-on
some theoretical or historical baseline-when it comes to
determining the existence of fungibility?
CONCLUSION
Each side, then, seems splayed on a kind of tension. But how
serious is it?
Quite serious, I would argue. Conceivably, there could be a story
that explains why it is appropriate, as aid opponents would have it,
to use the existent status quo of what government is providing as
a baseline when the issue is incentive, but to insist on some
normative baseline of what schools might be providing when the
issue is fungibility. Likewise, there may be an account available to
aid supporters that explains why they fly toward a normative
conception of government responsibility when the issue is incentive,
but remain firmly on the ground of current existence when the
question is school responsibility. In any case, neither side has
advanced one. Indeed, my claim is that to analyze constitutional
discourse over state aid to parochial schools is to see that these
mirror-image and internally conflicting existential-normative
assumptions about baselines occupy rock bottom in the
argumentation of either side. There is nothing further beneath or
sustaining them. They form a central instance of what Joseph
William Singer calls "contradiction all the way down."181
Nowhere is the primordial incompatibility between existential
and normative approaches to baseline illustrated more trenchantly,
as a general proposition, than in Cass R. Sunstein's The Partial
Constitution."2 For Sunstein, the conflict between those who take
"existing arrangements," "existing practices," and "the status quo
as the baseline" for analyzing the constitutional effect of law and
policy,' and those who "abandon[] the status quo as a baseline and
181. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 467, 537 (1988)
(reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM ATYALE: 1927-1960 (1986)).
182. SUNSTEIN, supra note 12.
183. Id. at 3-4.
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instead rel[y] on... principle"184 or "historical context,"185 is the
fundamental faultline in American constitutional jurisprudence.
True, there are some important differences between Sunstein's
discussion and the one I am offering here. Sunstein, for example,
devotes scant attention to Establishment Clause issues
themselves,186 and his short discussion-which concludes that
"[g]overnment is constitutionally authorized to be neutral as
between [public and private schools], but it is under no obligation
of neutrality' 8 7--simply describes the parameters or the arena in
which constitutional combat takes place. It does not report on the
contest itself. In concluding that government does not have to fund
parochial schools, Sunstein simply brings the discussion up to the
point where my Article begins, namely whether government
assistance to religious schools in a variety of different cases violates
the Constitution. In any case, Sunstein's concern is to show how one
side in any given constitutional struggle-such as the debates over
pornography, abortion, or campaign finance-assumes an
existential baseline, while the other side adopts a normative
approach. His concern is not to show, as I do here, how the
existential-normative dichotomy splits sides themselves and places
each partisan in an internal contradiction. Additionally, Sunstein,
of course, wants to argue against an existentialist and in favor of a
normative approach to baselines,8 8 whereas that is not my objective
here. But what Sunstein does very clearly show, for my purposes,
is that the conflict between existential and normative baselines is
an animating one lying rock bottom in constitutional law. And if the
two cannot be reconciled, then particular positions that rely on both
must fall into a kind of inveterate inner conflict.
There is, however, also a confusion in Sunstein's analysis that
helps underscore what is so uniquely vexing about the kind of
contradiction that plagues opponents and proponents alike in the
school-aid cases. At times, Sunstein seems to conceive the
184. Id. at 81.
185. Id. at 76.
186. See id. at 307-08.
187. Id. at 308.
188. See id. at 4-7; see also Emily Sherwin, A Comment on Cass Sunstein's Equality, 9
CONST. Co ENTARY 189, 192 (1992) (describing Sunstein's approach as both "normative"
and based in "history").
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"existential status quo" as I do here, namely, as the present
situation whatever it happens to be at the moment of controversy.
But on other occasions, he seems to take the existential status quo
as of 1937 by speaking of "[sitatus quo neutrality, pre-New Deal
style," and at other times, he goes back even further by identifying
the Common Law itself as the status quo baseline."8 9 Indeed, this
is precisely why he is able to chide jurists who fail to find normative
arguments to justify whatever particular existential "status quo"
baseline they choose; as he says: "A decision to use the status quo
as the baseline wouldbe entirely acceptable if the status quo could
beindependentlyjustified.... [Problems arise] when the status quo
is used without adequate justification or merely by reflex."90
For my purposes, the problem with Sunstein's argument here is
that while one can imagine a normative argument being made for
any specific baseline, such as the threshold of the New Deal or the
emergence of the Common Law, one cannot imagine a normative
argument being made for whatever the status quo of the present
moment happens to be. Such a notion of the status quo is "content-
independent." 9 ' It simply embraces too promiscuous a set of
possibilities for any particular "norm" or "principle" to capture,
swinging wildly as it would from baselines that include or exclude
all manner of government aid, or baselines that include or exclude
a wide array of school responsibilities, depending on the time and
place, and the program and jurisdiction involved. Hence, while
Sunstein holds out hope that some of the existential status quo
baselines he posits-pre-New Deal, post-Common Law-can be
justified on some set of normative arguments, the reason they can
is that they are set in stone and are thus fundamentally distinct
from the existential baseline as I use that term: whatever the
present state of the world happens to be. 192
What I take from Sunstein, then, is that the conflict between
existential and normative baselines is a fundamental one in
189. SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 82.
190. Id. at 6, 348.
191. See Frederick SchauerActs, Omissions, and Constitutionalism, 105 ETHICS 916,921
(1995).
192. That is why on my scheme, Sunstein's "existential" baselines of pre-New Deal and
post-Common Law would be treated as straightforwardly normative, implying or promising
as they do some sort of theoretical or historical justification.
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constitutional law. 9 ' What I add to it is the suggestion that in this
case-the case of parochial-school aid-it is also an implacable one
since here, the existential can never become normative, and each
side in the parochial-school aid cases finds its loyalty divided
between the two. My story thus does not have a happy, nicely
wrapped-up ending, for we are left to ask: Why is it appropriate, as
aid opponents claim, to take the existential status quo-whatever
government happens to be providing at the moment-as the
baseline to determine whether incentive exists, and hence whether
the money is more public or private, and yet renounce the
existential status quo-whatever schools happen to be providing at
the moment-as the baseline for determining whether fungibility
exists, and hence whether the aid serves a public or a private
purpose? And why is it fine to adopt a distinctive normative or
theoretical approach to baseline government responsibility in the
debate over incentive, as aid defenders do, while rejecting any such
notion in favor of a relentlessly existential approach to baseline
school responsibility in the debate over fungibility?
If government's baseline responsibilities are to be determined by
looking simply at the existing status quo, why not so determine the
school's? On the other hand, if the government's baseline
responsibilities are to be ascertained by adopting some normative
or historical perspective, why not so ascertain the school's? At
present, neither side has an answer to these questions.
193. See also Anna T. Majewicz, Note, Baseline Analysis: Broadening the Judicial
Perspective, 65 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 495, 496 (1991) ("[O]ne's perspective, embodied in
'baselines,' profoundly affects one's analysis of a problem and ultimately may determine its
resolution. Because the choice of baseline critically directs the judicial decision-making
process, a court should explicitly acknowledge and identify its choice in its legal analysis.")
(citations omitted).
1506 [Vol. 42:1437
